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DESTRUCTIVE RULES OF CERTAINTY AND
EFFICIENCY: A STUDY IN THE CONTEXT
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PROCEDURE AND THE UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS
Amy D. Ronner*
I.

INTRODUCTION

John Keats, the nineteenth-century British poet, once described
achievement as follows:
[S]everal things dove-tailed in my mind, and at once it struck
me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so
enormously-I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a
man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts,
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.1
Keats' epiphany about literary attainment and the equation of greatness with "negative capability" or the capacity "of being in uncertainties" appears almost antipodal to what has become a predominant
jurisprudential pursuit-the quest for certainty. In many areas of the
law there is a resolve to accomplish what is, of course, virtually impossible-namely the eradication of mystery and doubt and instead, create rules of ostensible certainty, ones which are supposed to foster the
swift and efficient resolution of disputes. As such, the negative capability that Keats worshipped is precisely what the law abhors.
Although the quest for certainty and efficiency manifests itself in
many different areas of the law, it is strikingly apparent in the more
frequent use of summary judgment procedure. Before the trilogy in
1986 of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,'
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D., 1985, University of Miami; Ph.D., 1980, University of Michigan; M.A., 1976, University of Michigan;
B.A., 1975, Beloit College. I am most grateful to Priscilla Warren, my research assistant.
1. Letter from John Keats to George and Thomas Keats (Dec. 22,1817), in THE ComPLETE POETICAL WORKS AND LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 277 (Horace E. Scudder ed. 1899).

2. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
3. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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and Matsushita Electric IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,' federal
courts were disinclined to grant summary judgment. The remarks of
one federal district judge in Louisiana who said, "it is only with great
caution and much soul-searching that such motions will be granted[,]"
are among many portraying summary judgment as a creature of disrepute.5 More specifically, before the Celotex cases, courts tended to
regard summary judgment as a harsh and terminal remedy and also
feared that litigants would abuse the motion to delay the proceedings
and harass their opponents.6 Also, courts viewed the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects the
jury trial in civil actions, as one of the most potent obstacles to the use
of such a procedural device, which could dispense with trial.1

4. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
5. Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 543 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (W.D. La. 1982),
aff'd, 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), is often treated as the seminal case on the restricted use of Rule
56. Other courts have openly criticized the summary judgment device. See Avrick v.
Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1946) ("The power to pierce the
flimsy and transparent factual veil should be temperately and cautiously used lest abuse
reap nullification."); Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940) (cautioning
against using summary judgment as "a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants
into its toils and deprive them of a trial"). See generallyMartin B. Louis, FederalSummary
Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE LJ. 745, 760-62 (1974) (describing
"slightest doubt" approach to summary judgment).
6. See, e.g., Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, 799 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1986); Yuba
Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See generally Max Gitter,

Summary Judgment, in FEDERAL

CIVIL PRACrTCE

1988, at 441 (FLI Litig. & Admin. Prac-

tice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5058, 1988) (recognizing potentially harmful uses
and effects of summary judgment mechanism). For a discussion of the history of summary
judgment, see Gary T. Foremaster, Comment, The Movant's Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 UTAH L. RIv. 731, 731-34 (1987).
7. See, e.g., Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ("Trial by affidavit is no
substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of 'even handed justice.' ");
Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting summary judgment "is a drastic device since its prophylactic function, when exercised, cuts off
a party's right to present his case to the jury"); see also William W Schwarzer et al., The
Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 441 (1992) (viewing summary judgment as
shortcut depriving litigants of right to jury trial). For discussions of the Seventh Amendment and civil jury trials, see Morris S. Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry into the Right to Trial
by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980); Morris S. Arnold, A
Modest Replication to a Lengthy Discourse, 128 U. PA. L. Rnv. 986 (1980); Edith Guild
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. Rsv. 289 (1966);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdic4 and the Adjudication Process, 49 Onio ST. L.J. 95, 162-70
-(1988); Stephen A. Bullington, Comment, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: Summary
Judgment Following Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 171, 177-78 (1988).
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In 1986 the United States Supreme Court inaugurated a new era
by emphasizing that summary judgment was not a "disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather... an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.' "8Thus, the once mistrusted summary
judgment device became apotheosized into the deity of certainty, one
which could vanquish mystery and doubt and engender efficiency. As
several commentators stated in their post-Celotex monograph:
Summary judgment has become recognized not only as a
procedure for avoiding unnecessary trials on insufficient
claims or defenses but also as an effective case management
device to identify and narrow issues. The Supreme Court
had it right almost ninety years ago when it said summary
judgment "prescribes the means of making an issue." Properly used, summary judgment helps strip away the underbrush and lay bare the heart of the controversy between the
parties. It can offer a fast track to a decision or at least substantially shorten the track.'
Such praise was not anomalous after Celotex. Summary judgment was-lauded as "a bench trial on paper" 10 and likened to a "procedural bullet in the litigator's gun[,]" which could obliterate a "claim
or affirmative defense" and thus, "sav[e] the expense of further trial
preparation and the uncertainty of trial."' In fact, commentators
dubbed the year 1986 as the "turning point for Rule 56" and the
Supreme Court's promotion of the use of summary judgment not only
"as an effective means of disposing of unmeritorious litigation in a
system... already overwhelmed with business[,]" but also as "being a
cause for celebration among most federal practitioners."' 2 A United
States District Judge, who had been a proponent of Rule 56 reform
and had once lamented that summary judgment was "plagued by confusion and uncertainty[,]"' 3 rejoiced in what the judge saw as the be8. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
9. Schwarzer et al., supra note 7, at 451-52.
10. Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the
Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1987).
11. Robert Holmes Bell, Summary Judgment in the FederalCourts, 69 Micii. B.J. 1038,
1038 (1990).
12. Robert M. Bratton, Summary Judgment Practice in the 1990s: A New Day Has
Begun-Hopefully, 14 AM. J. TmAL ADvoc. 441, 443 (1991).
13. William W Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Underthe FederalRules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 465 (1984).
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ginning of the Rule's vindication.14 Also, after the Celotex decisions,
one professor's comment that "the law waxes eloquent on the laudatory goal of judicial economy[,]" expressed what had become a
penchant for touting summary judgment as the great panacea.1 5 Commentators believed that the summary device could bring about certainty and efficiency in all sorts of complex disputes, like those
involving patent infringement,' 6 employment discrimination,' 7 products liability,18 antitrust conspiracy, 19 and trademark and unfair
competition.20
The quest for certainty and efficiency also surfaces in a substantive area of the law, which governs particular disputes that arise out of
letter of credit transactions. A letter of credit is an engagement by a
bank or other issuer to pay a sum of money upon presentation of documents that comply with its terms. 21 Letter of credit transactions are
often triangular and thus involve an issuer, a customer, and a benefici14. William W Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110
F.R.D. 213, 213-14 (1986).

15. Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoC. 433, 433 (1987).

16. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Basic Motion Practicefor the Accused Infringer, 15
AM. INTEL.L. PROP. L. ASS'N QJ. 124,153-74 (1987); see also Schwarzer et al., supra note 7,

at 468-69 (discussing application of summary judgment to patent claims presenting mixed
question of law and fact).
17. See, e.g., John V. Jansonius, The Role of Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 4 LAB. LAW. 747 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Schwarzer et al., supra note 7, at 471.
19. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment,Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. LJ. 1065 (1986);
Schwarzer et al., supra note 7, at 462-64; John R. Heninger, Note, The Evolving Summary
Judgment Standardfor Antitrust Conspiracy Cases, 12 J. Cons. L. 503 (1987).
20. See, e.g., Ronald S. Rosen & Douglas C. Fairhurst, Summary Judgment in Copyright, Trademark & Unfair Competition Litigation, in LmOArINo CopyPoniG TRADEMARK, AND UNFAIR Compr,-aoN CAsEs 1992, at 525-33 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3893, 1992).
21. See generally definitions of letters of credit in Tennyson W. Grebenar & Thomas H.
Young, Letters of Credit in Limited Partnership Financing-A Legal 7ime Bomb?, 13
CoLo. LAW. 1989, 1990 (1984) (definitions and origins of letters of credit); Henry Harfield,
Are Letters of Credit an Endangered Species?, 64 N.Y. ST. BJ. 38, 38 (1992) (discussing
differences between letters of credit and other financial instruments); David C. Howard,
The Application of Compulsory Joinder,Intervention,Impleader and Attachment to Letter
of Credit Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 957, 957 (1984) (how letters of credit operate);
Victor F. Ptasznik, The Letter of Credit UnderArticle 5, 70 MICH. BJ. 299,299 (1991) (how
letters of credit operate). For leading works on letters of credit, see JoHN F. DoLAN, THE
LAW OF LErmas OF CREDIT (2d ed. 1991); J. WHrrE & R. SuMMERs, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CDE

of credit).

(3d ed. practitioners ed. 1988) (see App. B for sample forms for standby letters
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ary. 22 The issuer is typically a bank to whom the customer has applied
for credit and the customer is usually a buyer of goods. 2 The beneficiary, most often the seller, is the party that receives payment under
the letter of credit.24

Letters of credit, inveterate commercial tools, which some legal
historians have traced back about more than 3000 years,2 5 were
designed to provide sellers of goods in international transactions with

assurance of payment when they properly delivered the goods.26 That
is, the letter of credit enabled the seller or beneficiary, who took the
risk of shipping goods long distances, to count on being paid by a dependable financial institution. The letter of credit also bestowed upon
the buyer or customer a modicum of protection because the buyer
knew that the seller would not get paid until it transferred documents
evidencing actual delivery of the goods. 27
22. See Edgardo E. Colon, Letters of Credit in limes of Business and Bank Failures,
107 BANKING Li. 6, 7 (1990); John F. Dolan, The CorrespondentBank in the Letter-ofCredit Transaction, 109 BANKING LJ. 396, 396 (1992) [hereinafter Dolan, The Correspondent Bank]; Howard, supra note 21, at 957-60; Jonathan D. Thier, Note, Letters of Credit:
A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 848,848-49

(1982).
23. Colon, supra note 22, at 7; Howard, supra note 21, at 957-60; Thier, supra note 22,
at 848-49.
24. Colon, supra note 22, at 7; Dolan, The CorrespondentBank, supra note 22, at 396;
John F. Dolan, Strict Compliance With Letters of Credit Striking A Fair Balance, 102
BANKING LJ.18,18 (1985) [hereinafter Dolan, Strict Compliance];Howard, supra note 21,

at 958-59; Thier, supra note 22, at 849.
25. For a discussion of the history of letters of credit, see generally Voest-Alpine Int'l
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 682 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting nearly
3000-year-old lineage of letter of credit). See also Boris Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of
the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 Am. J. Cormp. L. 395, 395-400 (1965-1966)
(reviewing history of letters of credit); G. MALYNEs, Tim ANcinmz LAW MERCHANT ch. 14

(1686) (discussing history of letters of credit).
26. Diane Furman Dann, Confirming Bank Liability in Letter of Credit Transactions:

Whose Bank Is It Anyway?, 51 ForDHAM. L. Rnv. 1219, 1219-21 (1983); Grebenar &
Young, supra note 21, at 1990; Thier, supra note 22, at 848-51.
27. Letters of credit are categorized as either "commercial" or "standby." As one
commentator has succinctly explained:
A commercial letter of credit operates as a payment mechanism. It has its origin
and primary use in the international sale of goods. The parties to a commercial
credit open it with the understanding that the credit will be drawn upon in the
ordinary course. On the other hand, the opposite expectation is associated with
the issuance of a standby credit. It acts as a guaranty mechanism for the beneficiary in the event the account party defaults in a payment or performance
obligation.
Ptasznik, supra note 21, at 299; see also Colon, supra note 22, at 8 (noting that letters of
credit function like guarantees); Richard B. Potter, The Drafting and Enforcement of Canada]UnitedStates Contracts: A CanadianLawyer's Perspective, 20 INT'L LAW. 3, 6-9 (1986)

(explaining use of letters of credit to gain stronger position against general creditors).
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One of the most fundamental doctrines in the law of letters of
credit is the so-called independence principle.2 Because the letter issues for the benefit of the seller, the "independence principle" obligates the issuer to pay when the seller presents the proper documents.
The issuer cannot be relieved of this obligation even if the customer
complains of problems with the underlying transaction. As courts and
commentators have put it, "a letter of credit is independent of the
primary contract of sale between the buyer and the seller."' 29 .

The independence principle is, of.course, another rule of certainty and efficiency, As one noted expert in the field has explained,
"the independence principle insulates the letter of credit from disputes over the performance of collateral agreements and allows the
letter of credit to function as a swift and certain payment mechanism."' 0 As another expert has summed it up, "[p]rompt and certain
payment is the [very] feature of the credit that motivates the beneficiary to insist that his obligor (the account party) [bank's customer] in
the underlying transaction cause the bank to open the credit in the
first place."31
There is another fundamental doctrine in the law of letters of
credit-that of strict compliance 3 2 The rule of strict compliance
28. See generally Colon, supra note 22, at 7 (honoring of drafts required upon presentment of docuifients despite conditions of underlying contract); Grebenar & Young, supra
note 21, at 1990 (noting letters of credit are independent from primary contract between
buyer and seller); Henry Harfield, Ideritity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARiz.L. REv.
239, 240 (1982) (noting strict construction implies letter of credit terms are consulted but
not terms or considerations relevant to other relationships); Gerald T. McLaughlin, Letters
of Creditand Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the IndependencePrinciple,49"OHo ST. L.
1197, 1197 (1989) (asserting independence principle insulates letter of credit from disputes
arising out of collateral agreements); Dean Pawlowic, Letters of Credit: A Frameworkfor
Analysis of Transfer, Assignmen4 Negotiation and Transfer by Operation of Law, 39
WAYNE L. REv. 1, 5 (1992) (noting that independence principle distinguishes between
guarantees and other similar terms); Ptasznik, supra note 21, at 300 (listing independence
principle as second of three governing principles); Thier, supra note 22, at 851-52 (noting
letter of credit is engagement to support agreement to pay money under contract).
29. Sztejn v. I. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
see Colo. Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36 (Colo. 1981); see also
supra note 28 and accompartying text (providing examples of how independence principle
obligates issuer).
30. McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 1197.
31. Dolan, Strict Compliance, supra note 24, at 18 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
32. For articles containing discussions of strict compliance .in
letter of credit transactions, see Financing:.Letter of CreditRequiresStrictCompliance, RXAL Esr. L. REP., Sept.
1992, at 6; P. Georgia Bullitt & Laura I. Lagomarsino, Protecting Intellectual Property
Rights Abroad. New Uses for Political Risk Insurance and Standby Letters of Credit, 5
INT'L TAx & Bus. LAW. 283, 315-16 (1987); Dolan, The CorrespondentBank, supra note
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cooperates with the independence principle in aiming to accomplish
certainty and efficiency. Under the rule of strict compliance, the bank
reviewing the documents must determine whether they strictly comply
with the requirements of the letter of credit. If the documents do not
comply with the letter in any respect, the bank must dishonor them.
In this way, the rule of strict compliance aims to make the bank's task
purely ministerial and frees the bank from the exercise of discretion.
In essence, the strict-compliance rule precludes the bank from
looking beyond the face of the documents to the underlying transaction. As such, the rule serves to ensure adherence to the independence principle by keeping the letter of credit separate from the
business deal and in so doing helps to advance the goal of certainty
and efficiency. Most significantly, one of the only real exceptions to
the independence principle is for fraud a3 That is, in some instances,
fraud will excuse a bank from honoring documents even though they

appear on their face to comply with the letter.
Because letters of credit are part of so many commercial transactions and because additional parties become involved in and thus
complicate the configuration, many disputes can and do arise in the
letter of credit context. 34 Consequently, the promotion of a certain
22, at 398-99; Dolanj Strict Compliance, supra note 24; John F. Dolan; Letter-of-Credit
Disputes Between the Issuer and Its Customer: The Issuer's Rights Under the Misnamed
"BifurcatedStandard," 105 BANKUn'G LJ.380, 380-81 (1988) [hereinafter Dolan, Letter-ofCredit Disputes]; Stanley F. Farrar & Henry Landau, U.C.C. Survey: Letters of Credit, 40
Bus. LAw. 1177,1177 (1985); Albert J. Givray et al., Leiters of Credit, 46 Bus. LAw. 1581,

1588-90 (1991) [hereinafter Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991)]; Albert J. Givray, Letters
of Credit,45 Bus. LAw. 2381,2383-93 (1990) [hereinafter Givray, Letters of Credit (1990)];

Albert J. Givray, Letters of Credit, 44 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1571-76 (1989) [hereinafter Givray,
Letters of Credit (1989)]; Harfield, supra note 21 at 39; Gerald T. McLaughlin, On the
Peripheryof Letter-of-CreditLaw: Softening the Rigors of Strict Compliance, 106 BANr,NG

L.J. 4 at 4-41 (1989) [hereinafter McLaughlin, On the Periphery];Tacy L. Howard, Note,
Gulf South Bank & Trust Company v. Holden: A Warning to Bankers Honoring Letters of

Credit, 52 LA. L. Rnv. 437, 445 (1991); 'flier, supra note 22 at 861-76.
33. See James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit, 48 Bus. LAW. 1635,163940 (1993); James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit, 43 Bus. LAw. 1353, 1374-77 (1988); Dolan,
The CorrespondentBank, supra note 22, at 399-400; Stanley F. Farrar, Letters of Credit, 42

Bus. LAw. 1307, 1311-12 (1987) [hereinafter Farrar, Letters of Credit (1987)]; Stanley F.
Farrar, Letters of Credit, 39 Bus. LAw. 1319, 1321-25 (1984) [hereinafter Farrar, Letters of

Credit (1984)]; Farrar & Landau, supra note 32, at 1181-84; Givray et al., Letters of Credit
(1991), supra note 32, at 1641-49; Givray, Letters of Credit (1989), supra note 32, at 162831; McLaughlin, supra note 28 at 1197-1217, 1235.
34. See Byrne, supra note 33, at 1353, stating that
[mI]ore significant than any one development affecting the law of letters of credit
in 1987 was the increase in the amount of litigation. More letter of credit opinions were reported in the last twelve months than appeared in the first seventyfive years of this century, and there is no indication that this trend is slowing
down.
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and efficient resolution of such disputes has been the subject of much
scholarship and an issue with which courts and legislatures have seriously grappled.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as enacted in many
states, and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-

its (UCP) are two main sources of law governing letters of credit.3 5
Most courts treat the UCP, a product of the Commission on Banking
Technique and Practice of the International Chamber of Commerce,
as if it were legislation. The UCP, however, does not automatically
apply to a transaction. Instead, it almost always comes into play when
the parties to the transaction agree that the UCP will govern them,
and the parties actually put a statement to that effect in the letter of
credit itself.3 6 The provisions of the UCP, which deal only with letters
of credit issued by banks, aim to promote certainty and efficiency not
just with respect to the letter of credit as a payment mechanism, but
also in connection with the resolution of disputes that arise when letter of credit transactions do in fact go awry.
See also Colon, supra note 22, at 6 ("To some extent, the increased litigation in this area
comes as a result of the increase in the number of players and their learning the rules of the
game."); Farrar & Landau, supra note 32, at 1177 ("[T]he cases tended to deal largely with
issues of nonconforming documents or fraud in the transaction. Recent bank failures have
given rise to further litigation involving letters of credit. . ."); Givray, Letters of Credit
(1990), supra note 32, at 2381 ("Unbelievably, letters of credit saw more action in court
during 1989 than 1988, itself a peak year. Much of this action poses deeper and darker
questions for lawyers and judges than in past years." (citation omitted)); Givray, Letters of
Credit (1989), supra note 32,at 1567 ("The cases poured ever forth in 1988."). For a discussion of multiparty letter of credit litigation, see Howard, supra note 21, at 964. See also
infra notes 69-73 (fraud as exception to independence principle).
35. Article 5 of the UCC usually governs the letter of credit in domestic transactions.
The first version of the International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits came out in 1933. The International Chamber of Commerce
had it revised in 1951, 1962, 1974, and 1983. See Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991),
supra note 32, at 1581-83. The International Chamber of Commerce had it revised again in
1993 and that version is in force as of January 1,1994. UNFORM CUSTOMS AND PRAccrIc
FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDrrs

(Int'l Chamber of Commerce 1993) [hereinafter UCP]. Sec-

tion 1-1-2(3), UCC allows parties to a letter of credit to give the UCP priority over the
UCC where the latter does not provide otherwise. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney
1991 & Supp. 1994) (allowing parties to choose coverage by UCP in lieu of UCC); see also
ALA. CODE § 7-5-102(4) (1993); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2702(D) (1994) (repealed
1984) (renumbered § 47-5102(D) allowing parties to govern their transaction according to
the UCP); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (Vernon 1994) (subjecting letters of credit to
UCP unless otherwise agreed). See generally discussion in Bullitt & Lagomarsino, supra
note 32, at 316 n.256 (citing U.C.C. § 1-102(3) as allowing parties to choose UCP over
UCC where UCC does not otherwise stipulate).
36. See Farrar,Letters of Credit (1984), supra note 33, at 1328-30 (discussing problems
with invoking UCP's election).
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With respect to the present Article, the substantive law of letters
of credit and the procedural device of summary judgment are only
exponents of this Author's broader thesis about the potentially deadly
and self-defeating proclivities of rules of certainty and efficiency.
Concededly, the problems and limitations associated with rules that
minister to certainty and efficiency, of course, surface in so many areas
of the law. The focus of this Article, however, which is designed to be
manageably narrow, is on only two separate provisions of the UCP,
ones that come into play in particular letter of credit disputes.
In Part I, I analyze two doctrines which are built into the UCPstrict compliance and automatic preclusion. As discussed above, the
rule of strict compliance precludes a bank from honoring a letter of
credit where there is even the slightest discrepancy between the documents and the letter. Most courts that have construed the UCP have
determined that it incorporates the strict-compliance rule. 37
The rule of preclusion, another component of the UCP, which I
also address in Part I, is essentially a sanction provision. The UCP
gives a bank "a reasonable time" to examine documents and decide
whether to accept or reject them.38 The UCP also requires that the
bank that decides to reject the documents provide its rejection notifi'39
cation "by telecommunication or... by other expeditious means.
That notification of rejection must also delineate the fatal discrepancies and describe the fate of the rejected documents. 4° The UCP,
moreover, bars the bank that fails to comply with the timeliness or
rejection notification requirements from dishonoring the documents.4 '
Also in Part I, I explain how the rule of strict compliance and the
sanction of automatic preclusion, both of which serve the same goal of
certainty and efficiency in letter of credit transactions, can and sometimes do become fierce combatants. At that juncture, I introduce
what is denominated the "rectangular" transaction, which occurs
when an additional party, usually a second bank, steps into the letter
of credit triangle.42 Although transactions can become rectangular for
37. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
38. UCP, art. 13(b) (1993). The 1993 revision of the UCP clarifies that the time frame
is "not to exceed seven banking days following the day of receipt of the documents." Id.
39. UCP, art. 14(d)(i) (1993). The 1993 revision ofthe UCP clarifies that the rejection
notification must be "no later than the close of the seventh banking day following the day
of receipt of the documents." Id

40. Id. art. 14(d)(ii).
41. Id. art. 14(e).
42. See Dolan, The CorrespondentBank, supra note 22, at 396 ("In international practice, the transaction is usually rectangular, for a fourth party, the correspondent bank, a
U.S. bank in this model, enters the transaction between the issuer andthe seller."); see also
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many different reasons, the rectangle is usually the product of a deal
involving an issuer and beneficiary, which reside in different countries;
or one in which a beneficiary simply does not trust the credit worthi-"
ness of the issuer.43 In either instance, the beneficiary will often insist
that a bank in its own locale serve as a confirming bank, which will be
the one to actually pay out on the letter of credit.
Part I of this' Article closes with a description of a dispute that
arises in the context of a rectangular letter of credit transaction:
namely, one between the issuing bank and confirming bank. The dispute involves a confirming bank that violates the rule of strict compliance by wrongfully paying out on nonconforming documents as well
as an issuing bank that triggers the preclusion sanction by failing to
notify the confirming bank of its rejection of the same documents in a
timely and proper fashion. One of the things that make such disputes
so interesting is that they typically involve an ostensibly villainous
beneficiary that perpetrates a fraud on both banks and absconds with
the money. Thus, when the problem actually reaches the court, the
issue' becomes which of the two banks-both of them victims-will
have to bear the loss. But what -really makes this battle between the
banks so significant is that it is an illustrative fray in the larger war,
which is really one between two rules of certainty and efficiency.
In Part II, I address a seminal Second Circuit decision in the rectangular dispute of Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co.,44 in which the court had to decide which bank must bear
the loss. The Cochin case, decided under the UCP, involved a confirming bank that violated the rule of strict compliance as well as an
issuing bank that triggered the preclusion sanction.
It is here, however, in connection with my analysis of Cochin that
I return to my focus on the supposedly certain and efficient mechanism of summary judgment and try to expose what is really the internal repugnancy of Cochin. That is, both the federal district court and
appellate court in Cochin appear to kowtow to summary judgment as
Colon, supra note 22, at 7 (referring to second bank as "confirming" bank); Dann, supra
note 26 and accompanying text (defining "confirming" bank as second bank in a rectangular transaction).
43. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (providing examples of circumstances
which lead to rectangular transactions).
44. 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986). Where specifically referring to the trial or appellate court decisions, subsequent referrals and citations
to the opinion of'the District Court for the Southern District of New York will be to
Cochin I, and references to the opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal will be to
Cochin II.
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the shaman that can lead to the expeditious resolution of such letter of
credit cases. The Second Circuit, however, at least implicitly, contemplates a whole sphere of mystery and doubt. In its reasoning, the Second Circuit envisions a rectangular letter of credit dispute, which,
hypothetically presenting enough uncertainty, will-and perhaps
should-inexpeditiously go to trial. Stated otherwise, in Cochin II,
the Second Circuit enumerates specific factors, which had they existed
in the, Cochin case itself, would have made the particular dispute a
factual one, one not suited for summary resolution. At the close of
Part II, I propose that the approach, which the Second Circuit implicitly endorsed, is the proper one. That is, the Second Circuit considers
not just fairness but also the salutary objective of preventing fraud
upon banks and allows both policies to temper the goal of certainty
and efficiency.
In Part III, I analyze an Eleventh Circuit case, Banque de l'Union
Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover International Banking
Corp.,45 which followed Cochin. What makes the Banque decision
both interesting and disturbing is that although it presents the precise
circumstance that the Second Circuit in Cochin II indicated might and
should at the very least survive summary judgment' and although it
purports to adhere to Cochin, Banque actually defies Cochin by
resolving such a letter of credit dispute on a motion for summary
judgment.
At the end of Part III, I explain how in Banque, both the district
court and the Eleventh Circuit, in seeking to advance what had become mere abstractions-certainty and efficiency-undermined what
is, in essence, the whole basis behind the judicial process. Specifically,
in Banque, the blind reverence for certain and efficient results engendered not only an unfair result of forcing a less culpable party to bear
a substantial loss, but also created a precedent which could effectually
facilitate bank fraud.
In the conclusion of this Article, borrowing the reasoning of the
Second Circuit in Cochin II, I suggest how cases like Banque should
be decided. In so doing, I return to my broader thesis that rules of
certainty and efficiency can be as self-defeating as scorpions that turn
their stingers upon themselves. I also, reinvoking Keats' concept of
"negative capability," suggest that there need not be such a clear demarcation between literary and legal aspirations.' Specifically, law.
45. 787 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd per curiam, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992)
(opinion on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
46. KEATS, supra note 1, at 277.
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can and should, at least on occasion, aspire toward what poets, like
Keats, have ascribed to great literary achievement-that is, the cultivation of some capacity of "being in uncertainties." 47
II. POTENTIALLY COMBATANT RULES OF CERTAINTY AND

EFFCVIENCY: STRICr COMPLIANCE AND
AUTOMATIC PRECLUSION

The rules of strict compliance and preclusion are part of the UCP.
Most of the time, they coexist quite peacefully.
Under what was Article 15, "[b]anks must examine all documents
with reasonable care to ascertain that they appear on their face to be
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit."48 Most
courts apply the doctrine of strict compliance to Article 15. 49 As one
federal appellate court put it:
[L]etters of credit are subject to a rule of "strict compliance."
Documents presented for payment must precisely meet the
requirements set forth in the credit. Any discrepancy entitles
the bank to refuse payment, and the bank bases its decision
on the documents alone.5
Strict compliance means precisely that.5 1 As one court has explained it, "[c]ompliance with the terms of a letter of credit is not like
47. Id.
48. UCP art. 15 (1983). The above-quoted language in Article 15 is essentially the
same in Article 13(a) of the 1993 revision. See UCP art. 13(a) (1993).
49. See generally Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. FDIC, 872 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1989)
(issuing bank required to state all reasons for dishonoring credit when first presented);
Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding twelve to thirteen days insufficient for meeting requirement of notification without delay). For a list of cases holding that documents must conform to the terms of the
letter of credit, see Bullitt & Lagomarsino, supra note 32, at 315-16 n.252. Under the 1983
UCP, the parties may "instruct the bank beforehand to pay the beneficiary upon presentation of any number of documents indicating that goods to be paid for under a letter of
credit had been shipped." Id. at 316 (footnote omitted); see also Clive M. Schmitthoff, The
New Uniform Customs for Letters of Credit, 1983 J. Bus. L. 193, 195 (stating that under
1983 UCP "obligation of the bank depends on certain conditions, such as the presentation
of specified documents").
50. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d at 973 (citing Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Dade
County, 371 So. 2d 545,548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)). Because neither the UCC nor the
UCP supplies a test for judging document compliance, the standard has been left to state
law. Integrated Measurement Sys., Inc. v. International Commercial Bank of China, 757 F.
Supp. 938, 943 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
51. A few courts, although purporting to follow the doctrine of strict compliance, have
construed it as "encompassing an allowance for arguable discrepancies that are minuscule
and not misleading." IntegratedMeasurement Sys., 757 F. Supp. at 944; see also Flagship
Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 705 (1st Cir. 1978)
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pitching horseshoes. No points are awarded for being close." 2 Thus,
"[i]f the documents do not on their face meet the requirements of the
credit, the fact that a defect is a mere 'technicality' does not matter[,] '5 3 and even the slightest discrepancy precludes the bank from
honoring the letter. 4
There is nothing especially philosophical about the doctrine of
strict compliance. 55 It is a rule firmly rooted in commercial reality and
serves the goals of certainty and efficiency. First, the rule "provide[s]

the beneficiary a source certain of payment in the event the issuer's
(holding "a variane ... is not fatal if there is no possibility that the documents could
mislead the paying bank to its detriment"). For a discussion of the relaxation of the strict
compliance standard, see Bullitt & Lagomarsino, supra note 32, at 316; Dolan, Strict Compliance, supra note 24, passim; Dolan, Letter-of-Credit Disputes, supra note 32, at 386 &
n.7; McLaughlin, On the Periphery, supra note 32, passim.
52. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 371 So. 2d at 546; see also Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Documents nearly the same as
those required are not good enough."); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 806 (4th Cir. 1975) ("There is no room for documents which are almost
the same, or which will do just as well." (citing Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners,
Ltd., 27 Lloyd's List Law Rpts. 49, 52 (1926))).
53. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d at 973.
54. See, e.g., Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 762 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding misspelled
name on bill of lading entitled bank to refuse to honor letter); Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp., 707
F.2d at 683, 686 (stating there is ground for dishonor where bills of lading indicating receipt
on board of scrap metal were dated Jan. 31 and inspection certificates revealed that cargo
was loaded between Feb. 2 and 6); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc., 528 F.2d at 803, 806 (stating
discrepancy between terms "100% acrylic yam" and "imported acrylic yam" was ground
for dishonor); Texpor Traders, Inc. v. Trust Co. Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1100, 1115 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding missing room number, misdescription of address on invoice, and omission
of word "Oxford" as grounds for dishonor).
55. There are supporters of the doctrine of strict compliance that have launched an
attack on the less rigorous substantial compliance standard. By way of example, one opinion is that:
Strict compliance invites certainty by setting a standard by which all parties to the
transaction can gauge conforming performance. Substantial compliance, on the
other hand, invites discretion by the issuer, who must determine whether compliance under the vague standard of "almost as good" is good enough. By diluting
the traditional literal standard of compliance, courts have forced issuers to assume the role of judges of first impression who must calculate, in a short period of
time, whether the beneficiary would have an action for wrongful dishonor or,
conversely, whether honor would be a bar to reimbursement. Such uncertainty
guarantees lawsuits, not payment, and therefore, frustrates the basic purpose of
the letter of credit.
Thier, supra note 22, at 866-67 (footnotes omitted); see also Dolan, Strict Compliance,
supra note 24, at 26-32 (criticizing substantial-compliance test as vague and unfair, but
essentially viewing estoppel law as healthy alternative, mitigating potential harshness of
strict-compliance standard); McLaughlin, On the Periphery, supra note 32, at 5 (asserting
effect of courts applying strict compliance in conjunction with other doctrines derived from
contract law, equity, and banking, results in softening of "the rigors of strict compliance"
and application of standard "more akin to substantial compliance").
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customer refuses to pay, 5' 6 and helps the beneficiary by "ensur[ing]
that banks . . . will be able to act quickly, enhancing the letter of
5' 7
credit's fluidity.

Second, the doctrine is designed to protect banks. Because of the
independence principle,58 which means that banks deal "only with
documents, not with merchandise[,]") 59 the doctrine, which forces the
beneficiary to strictly comply with the terms of the letter of credit,
aims to keep banks from becoming "embroiled in disputes between
the buyer and the seller."' Further, since the "issuing bank, or a
bank that acts as [a] confirming bank for the issuer, takes on an absolute duty to pay the amount of the credit to the beneficiary,"61 strict
compliance with the letter is "essential so as not to impose an obligation upon the bank that it did not undertake and so as not to jeopardize the bank's right to indemnity from its customer."'62
There are, however, letter of credit transactions which have a rectangular configuration. 63 These involve both an issuing bank and a
56. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1983).
57. Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp., 707 F.2d at 682-83; see also Dolan, Strict Compliance,
supra note 24, at 18-19 (stating that most courts recognize beneficiary's expectation of
prompt and certain payment).
58. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. As Dolan has explained, "[w]hen
the beneficiary presents documents that are not facially conforming, the issuer cannot investigate the underlying transaction to determine whether the defects are significant or
insignificant. Such investigation destroys the advantages of the credit device-certainty
and celerity. Once the issuer begins the inquiry, those advantages evaporate." Dolan, Letter of Credit Disputes, supra note 32, at 386.
59. CourtauldsN. Am., Inc., 528 F.2d at 805; see also Murphy v. FDIC, 12 F.3d 1485,
1489 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[L]etters of credit, by their very nature, represent an obligation of
the issuing bank independent of the relationship between the bank's customer, who asked
that the letter of credit be issued, and the beneficiary of the letter of credit."). It has been
emphasized that "[i]f the letter of credit is to retain its utility as a financing device, the
standard of strict compliance must be revitalized and consistently applied. Such a standard
ensures that prior to honor, the beneficiary has performed the protective conditions prescribed by the customer." Thier, supra note 22, at 856 (footnotes omitted).
60. CourtauldsN. Am., Inc, 528 F.2d at 805-06; see also Thier, supra note 22, at 852
("To involve the issuer in any of the myriad of performance problems in the underlying
transaction would frustrate the definite nature of the payment promise. Letter of credit
insulation emphasizes that performance under a letter is entirely a 'paper' transaction.")
(footnotes omitted).
61. Beyene, 762 F.2d at 6.
62. Id. (quoting Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp., 707 F.2d at 683). Because the issuing bank is
viewed as the confirming bank's customer, "the confirming bank has the same obligations
to the issuing bank ... as the issuing bank has to the original customer." Banque Paribas v.
Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 1985).
63. See Dolan, The CorrespondentBank, supra note 22, at 396-97, for a discussion of
the rectangular transaction in international practice. UCC § 5-103(1)(f) defines "confirming bank" as "a bank which engages either that it will itself honor a credit already issued by
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confirming bank. Letter of credit transactions become rectangular

when a beneficiary feels dubious about the issuer because it is located
in a distant country or because the beneficiary simply mistrusts the
credit worthiness of the issuer.6 In such instances, the beneficiary will
require that a local bank be the confirming bank or the bank that will
actually pay out on the letter of credit.,

When a confirming bank becomes part of the transaction, there is
an additional purpose behind the doctrine of strict compliance.
Although it is not unusual that the confirming bank is "a local firm in
cahoots with the beneficiary," 65 the problem is that once the confirming bank pays that beneficiary, the issuing bank is obliged to reimburse it.66 Consequently, some courts have recognized that in such
rectangular transactions with both an issuing and confirming bank, it
is "all the more important that the confirming bank be required to
comply with the literal terms of the letter of credit."'67 Thus, by holding confirming banks to the strict compliance standard, the rule serves
another bank or that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third bank." U.C.C.
§ 5-103(1)(f) (1990); see also Colon, supra note 22, at 7 (explaining seller may present
requisite documents for credit from confirming bank which then presents documents to
issuing bank for payment); Dann, supra note 26, at 1219-21 (explaining confirming bank's
role in international transactions as providing additional security to beneficiary but adding
risk to customer).
64. See Bullitt & Lagomarsino, supra note 32, at 317; Colon, supra note 22, at 7; Dann,
supra note 26, at 1219-20.
65. Banque Paribas, 767 F.2d at 384; see also ROBERT BRAUCHER & ROBERT A.
REGERT, INTRODUCMION TO COMMERCIAL TRANsACTIONS 367 (1977) ("The seller who
lives in a country different from that of the buyer may insist upon dealing with a bank in his
own country; he may, therefore, require that a credit issued in the buyer's'country be confirmed by a bank in his own country."); HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDrrs AND AccEm'ANCES 37 (5th ed. 1974) ("The beneficiary may prefer to be secured by the liability of a
bank which is close at hand."); J.WIrn & ROBERT SUMMERi, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 18-1, at 710 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing con-

firming bank's potential liability to beneficiary). For an analysis of the role of the confirming bank and how, in letter of credit transactions, it places additional risks on the customer,
see Dann, supra note 26, at 1234-37.
66. In Dann, supra note 26, at 1228-30, the author presents a hypothetical that illustrates how the presence of a confirming bank in a 16tter of credit transaction can place
additional risks on the customer. As she explains:
Because the confirming bank deals directly with the beneficiary, it is often in a
better position than the issuer or customer to recognize forgery. However, because of geographical proximity, the confirming bank is often closely allied with
the beneficiary, and therefore may fail to fulfill the limited duty of good faith
imposed upon every party in a transaction governed by the Code. Because the
confirming bank is not amenable to suit by the ultimate customer, the customer
assumes the risk of the confirming bank's bad faith.
Id. at 1230-31 (footnotes omitted).
67. Banque Paribas,767 F.2d at 384.
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to "minimize the likelihood 68that a fraudulent demand for payment
will be made and accepted.

It, of course, makes sense that fraud is a well-recognized exception to the independence principle.69 Under certain circumstances,
the UCC contemplates that fraud may relieve a bank from its obligation to pay the beneficiary.7" As commentators have explained, "[i]f
[the] issuer were always bound by the face of presented papers, even
when seemingly clean in form but fouled by forgery or other fraud,
then letters of credit would be so prone to abuse as to become useless."7 1 Thus, fraud may provide an issuer with a defense in a suit
against it for wrongful dishonor.7" Fraud may also be a basis for a
court to enjoin a bank's payment on documents or a beneficiary's
draw or both.73
The rule of preclusion, also part of the UCP, is contained in what
was Article 16. Article 16 gives the issuing bank a "reasonable time in
which to examine the documents and to determine ... whether to take
up or to refuse the documents." 74 The provision also states:
If the issuing bank decides to refuse the documents, it must
give notice to that effect without delay by telecommunication
or, if that is not possible, by other expeditious means, to the
bank from which it received the documents (the remitting

68. Id
69. See Dolan, The Correspondent Bank, sypra note 22, at 399-400; Grebenar &
Young, supra note 21, at 1993-94; McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 1197; Pawlowic, supra
note 28, at 6.
70. UCC § 5-114(2) (1990) constitutes the exclusive statutory scheme by which a letter
of credit payment can be prevented or avoided. See Barnes & Byrne, supra note 33, at
1639-41; Byrne, supra note 33, at 1374-80; Dolan, The CorrespondentBank, supra note 22,
at 399; Farrar, Letters of Credit (1984), supra note 33, at 1321-25; Farrar & Landau, supra
note 32, at 1181-84; Givray, Letters of Credit (1989), supra note 32, at 1620-31; Givray et
al.,
Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32, at 1641-51; Grebenar & Young, supra note 21,
at 1994; McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 1197; Pawlowic, supra note 28, at 6.
71. Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32, at 1642 n.326.
72. See Barnes & Byrne, supra note 33, at 1639-41; Byrne, supra note 33, at 1378-79;
Grebenar & Young, supra note 21, at 1994.
73. Byrne, supra note 33, at 1374-75; Givray, Letters of Credit (1989), supra note 32, at
1620-31; Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32, at 1641-49; Grebenar &
Young, supra note 21, at 1994.
74. UCP art. 16(c) (1983). Under Article 13(b) of the 1993 revision, the reasonable
time is "not to exceed seven banking days following the day of receipt of the documents."
Id. art. 13(b) (1993).
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Such notice must state the discrepancies in re-

spect of which the issuing bank refuses the documents....75
In addition, under that same Article, a bank that fails to comply with
such UCP's provisions is "precluded from claiming that the documents are not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
credit." 76
There are essentially two components of the timeliness and notification requirements of Article 1 7 The issuer has, a "reasonable
time" to examine the presented papers and to decide whether to accept or reject them.78 If the issuer does decide to reject the papers, it
must provide such notification "without delay by telecommunication
or, if that is not possible, by other expeditious means." 79 Also, when a
bank decides to reject the documents, the notification of dishonor
must spell out the discrepancies in the papers, which caused the issuer
to reject them,8 0 and state whether the issuer is holding the papers at
the presenter's disposal or returning them to the presenter.8 1
The prominent feature of Article 16, however, is what one set of
commentators have called its "sting" or "automatic preclusion" provision.82 Under Article 16, an issuer that has not complied with any
timeliness or dishonor notification requirement is simply barred from
dishonoring.
The principles behind the rule of preclusion are really not inimical to those underlying the rule of strict compliance. Like the rule of
strict compliance, Article 16 is just another vassal to the lord of certainty and efficiency. It serves to encourage the swift examination of
the documents and expeditious notification of dishonor, which, in
turn, aim to enhance the fluidity of the letter of credit.8 3
Also, the whole focus of Article 16, of course, is on the reviewing
of documents, a process which purposely divorces itself from anything
going on with respect to the underlying transaction. Such an empha75. Id art. 16(d) (1983). Under Article 14(d) of the 1993 revision, the notification
must not be "later than the close of the seventh banking day following the day of receipt of
the documents." Id art 14(d).
76. Id. art. 16(e) (1983). In the 1993 revision, the preclusion is contained in Article
14(e). Id art. 14(e) (1993).
77. For a discussion of Article 16, see Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra note

32, at 1626-27.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

UCP art. 16(c) (1983). See supra note 38 for the 1993 revision.
UCP art. 16(d) (1983). See supra note 39 for the 1993 revision.
UCP art. 16(d) (1983).
Id.
Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32, at 1626.
Id.
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sis, of course, harmonizes with the independence principle, which is
based on the traditional notion of a bank being not in the business of
goods, but solely in the business of documents." 4 Thus, like the rule of
strict compliance, Article 16 serves to nurture the independence
principle.
Further, the time frames in Article 16 aim to force a bank to give
the beneficiary an opportunity to cure discrepancies and take mitigative measures if the bank has rejected the documents. This particular
UCP's purpose derives from ancestral doctrines of estoppel and
waiver.85
In fact, the UCP's rule of preclusion is really a codification of
such estoppel and waiver doctrines. Classic estoppel situations involve "discoverable nonconformities," which the beneficiary could
have cured before the expiration of the letter of credit.8 6 Where, however, a bank omits to raise defects until the actual time of dishonor,
and in so doing effectually prevents the beneficiary from curing the
defects, courts will sometimes deem the bank to be estopped from
asserting such defects as grounds for dishonor. Consequently, estoppel typically occurs where a bank has either assured a beneficiary that
its documents complied with the letter of credit or has said nothing
while retaining the noncomplying documents for an unreasonably
long time after the beneficiary's presentmentY
84. See supra notes 28-30, 58-60 and accompanying text.
85. For discussions of waiver and estoppel, see Barnes & Byrne, Letters of Credit
(1993), supra note 33, at 1636-39; Byrne, Letters of Credit (1988), supra note 33, at 1370-71;
Dolan, Letter-of-Credit'Disputes,supra note 32, at 408-09; Dolan, Strict Compliance, supra
note 24, at 29-32; Givray, Letters of Credit (1990), supra note 32, at 2422-38; Givray, Letters
of Credit (1989), supra 32, at 1605-16; Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32,
at 1624-37; McLaughlin, On the Periphery,supra note 32, at 24-28.
86. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1541; see also Dolan, Strict Compliance,supra note 24, at
29-32 (asserting that two estoppel rules provide protection against abuse of strict compliance rule); McLaughlin, On the Periphery,supra note 32, at 24-28 (concluding that equitable doctrines of estoppel and waiver affect court's application of strict documentary
compliance).
87. See supra text accompanying note 86; see also Marino Indus. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d 112, 116-18, (2d Cir. 1982) (remanding because bank did not return
certificates until after letter expired which made it impossible for plaintiff to correct deficiencies); Data General Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D. Conn.
1980) (estopping bank from denying responsibility because bank held letter for six months
without notifying plaintiff of any indication that it intended to revoke letter); United States
Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662,666 (D. Conn. 1978) (estopping bank
from asserting defense where seller, based on bank's assurances, reasonably assumed bank
would honor its obligation under its letter of credit and where seller acted in reliance to its
detriment).
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Waiver situations are akin to those of estoppel. Classic waiver
cases involve issuers that attempt to justify dishonor on grounds which
are later deemed to be unjustified. 88 In such instances, courts conclude that "all other possible grounds for dishonor are... waived."89
Significantly, both classic estoppel and waiver share the element

of detrimental reliance, which is an issue that typically goes to the trier
of fact. Essentially, the beneficiary seeking to prove waiver or estoppel must demonstrate that by failing to specify defects or by specifying
defects in an untimely fashion, the bank actually induced its detrimental reliance. 90 As such, the beneficiary must show that the bank's conduct was what caused the harm or was what prevented it from curing
the defects before it was too late. 91
88. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1541.
89. Id. (emphasis added). Several commentators have explained the difference between "waiver" and "estoppel" as follows:
To charge waiver against issuer suggests that issuer meant to give up a known
right. In a true waiver, then, issuer has said or done something that signaled his
knowing retreat from his right to insist upon strictly complying documents. To
estop issuer means to bar issuer from asserting a right because issuer' conduct
would make assertion of the right unfair. Classic estoppel thus applies when issuer has failed to notify beneficiary of some discrepancy that was correctable
before the letter's expiry deadline. Issuer's silence or belated advice of discrepancies thus deprived beneficiary of an opportunity to make a curative re-presentment. In classic estoppel terms, beneficiary's reasonable relihnce upon issuer's
conduct caused beneficiary to suffer detriment. Courts, however, use "waiver"
and "estoppel" interchangeably towards the same end: to preclude issuer from
clubbing beneficiary with a noncompliance that would otherwise justify dishonor.
Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32, at 1624; see also Thier, supra note 22,
at 871 (arguing that issuer must make full disclosure of all documentary defects at time of
honor or dishonor, or be estopped from raising defects at trial). McLaughlin, On the Periphery, supra note 32, at 24-28, discusses the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. His thesis
is, however, that when courts apply such doctrines, they dilute the standard of strict compliance and end up, in effect, applying one of substantial compliance. Id. at 5. But see
Dolan, Strict Compliance, supra note 24, at 29-32 (suggesting that estoppel principles are
"healthy" and mitigate rigors of strict compliance standard without engendering vagueness
and unfairness of substantial compliance test.
90. See JoHN F. DoLAN, THE LAW OF Lurrs op CREDrr I 6.06[1][a] (2d ed. 1991);
Dolan, Strict Compliance, supra note 24, at 29-30; Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991),

supra note 32, at 1624-25.
91. In Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1237 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974), the Fifth Circuit stated:
[The issuer] cannot lull [the customer] into believing that there was no problem
with the documentation when there was still time for [the customer] to have attempted to cure the technical defect and then turn around and assert the lack
thereof as a defense to the suit on the draft.
See also Thier, supra note 22, at 871-72 ("Application of estoppel is usually conditioned
upon proof that the beneficiary could have cured the defect, not raised by the issuer, within
the effective period of the letter.").
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Although classic waiver and estoppel principles reside in Article
16, most commentators read the UCP's preclusion rule as being purely
automatic and as dispensing with detrimental reliance as a prerequisite to having a bank barred from dishonoring documents. 92 In fact, at
least one commentator praises the UCP's eradication of the prerequisite as a welcome promotion of the certain and efficient resolution of
the disputes that arise out of a bank's untimely or improper notification of dishonor. 93 Thus, the view is essentially that the rule of preclusion, by excising detrimental reliance and causation or prevention of
cure, issues which are well suited for the trier of fact, has ostensibly
made such disputes more amenable to summary resolution. 94
There is, however, still another aspect of Article 16 which is peculiar to the rectangular transaction. In such a context, Article 16 contemplates some protection for an issuing bank. Because of the often
cozy alliance between the confirming bank and its beneficiary, the
confirming bank can be predisposed to accept the beneficiary's presentment. 95 If, however, the confirming bank wrongfully honors nonconforming documents, Article 16's provisions effectually compel the
issuer to examine the documents within a "reasonable time" and to
notify the confirming bank of such fatal discrepancies "without delay."296 Thus, in the rectangular configuration, the notification provisions of the UCP contemplate and, in effect, encourage the issuing
bank to perform an overseer or watchdog role. In this way, the provisions prompt the issuing bank to exert some control over a payment
that will often take place in a distant land between a local confirming
bank and a local beneficiary.
It is in the rectangular transaction that the most dramatic disruption of the usual peaceful coexistence of the rule of strict compliance
and the preclusion sanction occurs. Such a collision of two rules of
92. See, eg., Dolan, The CorrespondentBank, supra note 22, at 419 n.47 ("The UCP
imposes a preclusion rule on the issuer without any showing of detriment."); Givray et al.,
Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32, at 1625-26.
93. Dolan, Letter-of-CreditDisputes, supra note 32, at 408 ("The estoppel rule of the
Uniform Customs and a similar estoppel rule fashioned by courts add to the efficiency of
the credit transaction by encouraging the correction of defects before it is too late, thereby
avoiding the inefficiencies for all parties that dishonor of the credit inevitably entails.")
(footnotes omitted).
94. There are commentators who wholeheartedly support the rule of automatic preclusion and believe that courts should apply it even when UCC § 5-112(1) or the 1974 version
of the UCP controls in lieu of the 1983 version. See summary of the views of Mr. Harfield
and Professors Dolan, white, and Summers in Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra
note 32, at 1625-26.
95. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
96. UCP art. 16(c), (d) (1983); see supra notes 38-39.
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certainty and efficiency arises when a confirming bank wrongfully
pays out on nonconforming documents, and an issuing bank fails to
provide timely or adequate notice of its decision to reject the same
documents. 97 Most significantly, this pugilistic arena illustrates how
obstinate quests for certainty and efficiency can and do lead to an
abyss of unfairness along with a concentric perpetuation of fraud on
banks.
III. CERTAINTY AND EFFICIENCY AFTER COCHIN

A.

Summary Judgment in the District Court

Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. ManufacturersHanover Trust Co.,98 was a
dispute between a confirming bank and an issuing bank, which arose
out of a rectangular transaction. In Cochin, the federal courts confronted the issue of which bank must bear the loss where the confirming bank had violated the rule of strict compliance, and the issuing
bank had triggered the preclusion sanction of Article 16 of the UCP.
In Cochin, a customer, Vishwa Niryat (Pvt.) Ltd. (Vishwa) requested the Bank of Cochin, Limited (Cochin), an Indian corporation,
to issue an irrevocable letter of credit covering up to $798,000 for the
benefit of a "purported" New York corporation, St. Lucia Enterprises,
Ltd. (St. Lucia). 99 The letter covered an anticipated shipment and
purchase of aluminum melting scrap and, after several amendments,
had an expiration date of June 15, 1980. In the transaction, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company (Manufacturers) served as the confirming bank.
In February 1980, Cochin requested Manufacturers to supply financial information on the beneficiary, St. Lucia. Manufacturers responded by telex the next day that "St. Lucia did not maintain a[]
[Manufacturers] account and that a thorough check of normal credit
sources did not reveal any 'pertinent' information." 1" Eight days
later, Cochin telexed to Manufacturers the terms and conditions of the
letter of credit, requested it to advise St. Lucia of the letter's establish97. See, e.g., Banque de l'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l Banking Corp., 787 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd per curiam, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir.
1992) (opinion on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Kuntal, S.A. v. Bank of
New York, 703 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trist Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
98. 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
99. Cochin I, 612F. Supp. at 1534.

100. Id
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ment, and asked it to add Manufacturers' confirmation. 1 1 The letter
of credit was issued subject to the UCP.1c In late February, Manufacturers mailed its written advice of the letter of credit's establishment
to St. Lucia and then confirmed the amended letter.10 3
The aluminum was supposedly shipped on May 29, 1980, from
West Germany to Bombay °4 In June, St. Lucia established an account at a Manhattan office of Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) and on June
9, presented Manufacturers with documents and ten sight drafts payable to St. Lucia 10 5 Manufacturers compared the documents against
the requirements of the letter and, determining that they complied
with all of its terms and conditions, negotiated the drafts and issued a
check for $798,000 payable to St. Lucia.'0 St. Lucia endorsed the
check and deposited it in its account at Citibank.1 7 Citibank collected
the check from Manufacturers and Manufacturers debited Cochin's
account for $798,000.1°o
On June 13 Manufacturers sent a, copy of its payment advice, together with the drafts and documents, to Cochin by registered air
mail. 10 9 Cochin, however, did not receive these documents until eight
days later.110 As it turned out St. Lucia had shipped nothing to
Vishwa and the documents that it had submitted to Manufacturers
were fraudulent in all respects."' In fact, the corporations that had
apparently issued the bills
of lading and quality and vessel certifica12
tions did not even exist.
On June 18 Cochin sent a telex to Manufacturers and inquired
whether St. Lucia had presented documents for negotiation.113 TWo
101. Id.
102. The letter of credit was governed by the 1974 version of the UCP pursuant to its
express terms. The district court, however, noted that the UCP was revised effective October 1, 1984. See id. at 1534 n.3. The court stated that it "must ordinarily apply the law in
effect at the time it renders its decision." Id. Although the application of the 1983 UCP
would favor Manufacturers, the court insisted it would not alter its decision on the mo-

tions. See id With respect to the discussion of Cochin in this article, references to the
UCP are to those in the 1983 version.
103. Id at 1534-35.
104. Id at 1535.

105. Id
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id at 1536.
Id
Id
Id.

110. Id
111. Id
112. Id
113. Id
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days later, Manufacturers informed Cochin by telex that it had already
paid St. Lucia and had already forwarded the documents to Cochin." 4
In a June 21 telex to Manufacturers, Cochin stated: "We acknowledge
receipt of the documentu [sic] Stop We find certain discrepancies [sic]
in the same Stop kindly donot [sic] make payment against the same
until we telex you otherwise Stop."115

In a telex of June 23, Manufacturers replied:
Reference your telex June 21 credit BB VN 4180 our 500748
Stop We note your telex fails' to give reason fro [sic] rejection
documents as required UCP Article 8 Stop According our
records documents fully complied credit terms and beneficiary already paid therefore we cannot accept your refusal of
documents. 1 6
In still another telex, dated June 27, Cochin informed Manufacturers of the alleged defects in the documents, which were those
Vishwa had apparently discovered. 117 By telex dated July 3, Cochin
asked Manufacturers to recredit its account for the amount and advised Manufacturers it was returning the documents. At that time
Cochin also cited an additional discrepancy." 8 A day later, Cochin
informed Manufacturers by telex that the documents were defective in
two more respects." 9
By telex of July i4,Manufacturers responded that Cochin had
failed to specify in a timely and proper fashion the alleged variances
and thus had not complied with what had become Article 16 of the
UCP. 12° Manufacturers also asserted that Cochin had failed to comply with the UCP by not promptly returning the documents or advis114. Id.
115. IL
116. I&
117. The alleged defects were as follows:
(1) St. Lucia's cable to Oriental showed the wrong insurance covernote number
of 4291 instead of 429711; (2) St. Lucia did not submit "proof" that a set of nonnegotiable documents and confirming cable had been sent to Vishwa; (3) only one
set of documents showed the original certificate of origin whereas the rest included only photocopies; and (4) the invoice packing list and certificate of origin
were not duly authenticated. Cochin also noted (5) the overpayment of $1,396.50.

Id.

118. The additional discrepancy was that "(6) [Manufacturers] had negotiated documents for St. Lucia Enterprises but that the letter of credit was established for St. Lucia
Enterprises Ltd." Id.
119. The additional defects were as follows: "(7) only five signed copies of the commercial invoices, rather than six, were forwarded and (8) documents were signed by 'D Agney'
without specifying his capacity at St. Lucia." Id.
120. Id. For a discussion of the UCP revision effective at the time of the district court's
decision, see supra note 102.
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ing that it was holding the documents at Manufacturers' disposal. In a
said that it still had not
follow-up telex two days later, Manufacturers
12 1
received certain documents from Cochin.
After the flurry of telexes failed to result in an amicable resolution, Cochin sued Manufacturers in federal court for wrongful honor
of the letter of credit and then both banks moved for summary judgment. In entering summary judgment in favor of Manufacturers, the
district court initially defined "[tihe central issue" as "whether St. Lucia's demand for payment from [Manufacturers] was in compliance
with the conditions specified in the letter of credit." " The real problem was, according to the court, that "[n]either the [UCP] nor the
[UCC] specify whether a bank honoring a letter of credit should be
guided by a standard of strict compliance or substantial compliance."'1 3 In so doing the court acknowledged that "[tihe great weight
of authority... holds that an issuing or confirming bank is usually
obligated to honor the beneficiary's draft only when the documents
are in strict compliance with the terms of the letter of credit.""2 4
In Cochin I, however, the decision did not entail mere deference
to the majority rule because there existed a rather anomalous impediment, which was New York's apparent "bifurcated standard of compliance." 1 New York courts applied the strict compliance standard in
cases in which beneficiaries sued banks for wrongful dishonor. When,
however, customers sued banks for wrongful honor, New York courts
relaxed the test and instead applied the standard of substantial compliance.126 The court in Cochin explained that "[t]he stated rationale
for the bifurcated standard is that it accords the bank flexibility in
reacting to 'a cross-fire of pressures... especially in times of falling
commodity prices.' "127 In the court's view, what the bifurcated stan121. Cochin I, 612 F. Supp. at 1536-37.
122. Id. at 1537.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1538.
126. See Dolan, Letter-of-Credit Disputes, supra note 32, at 388 n.13, in which he states:
In Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. ManufacturersHanover Trust Co., . . . the court, after
reviewing... cases and the views of various commentators, concluded: "In discussing New York's bifurcaied standard, courts and commentators have mistakenly cited each other and the following cases as support for the position that New
York courts use a bifurcated approach.. . ." [612 F. Supp.] at 1539 n.8. That
reading of the cases may be superficial.
For a discussion of Cochin I, see Dolan, Letter-of-CreditDisputes,supra note 32, at 389-92.
127. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1538 (citing J. WHirm & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 18-6, at 731-32 (citation omitted)); see
Dolan, Letter-of-Credit Disputes, supra note 32, at 390-91. Dolan writes:
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dard accommodates is a bank that is "caught between the 'rock of a
customer insisting on dishonor for highly technical reasons, and the
hard place of a beneficiary threatening to sue for wrongful dishonor.' "128 Thus, the application of a less rigorous standard in one
case and a strict one in the other alleviates the pressure on the bank
1 29
by limiting its "liability burden.'
In Cochin I, Manufacturers, seeking to avail itself of the more lax
standard, characterized itself as Cochin's "customer" and argued that
the St. Lucia's documents substantially complied with the letter of
credit. 3 ' Cochin's position, however, forced the court to grapple with
the question of whether the bifurcated standard had any bearing on
such rectangular disputes between issuing banks and confirming
banks.
The court reasoned that when a customer objects to defects that
are, in truth, "inconsequential," the issuing bank must exercise its
"good faith discretion."'' Typically though, an issuing "bank would
usually not want to exercise [such] discretion in favor of the beneficiary for fear that its right to indemnity would be jeopardized or that its
customer would break off existing banking relationships."' 3 Thus, in
such instances, the less stringent standard of substantial compliance is
33
the appropriate one because it has its own "built-in safety valve."'1
Specifically, the bank's preference for its customer over the beneficiary naturally inhibits the bank from misusing the less stringent standard.134 As such, the pressures inherent in the transaction itself
prevent the bank from taking too much comfort in a substantial-compliance test.
. The Cochin I court, however, viewed the rectangular transaction
as rather unique, as one which could conceivably spawn the abuse of
the less stringent test. Specifically, "[a] confirming bank, by contrast,
is usually in relatively close geographical proximity with the beneficiA fall in commodity price is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for application of a more lenient rule in the customer context. It is not the only time the
issuer faces the squeeze. In all of these cases the customer no longer values the
underlying contract. If it did, the customer would waive the documentary defects,
as customers do on a regular basis in letter-of-credit transactions.
Id.

128. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1538 (citing B. CLARK, THrn
CoLLECrIONs AND CREDrr CARDS
129. Id.
130. Id.

131. Id. at 1539.
132. I&
133. Id.
134. Id.

8.5[41, at 8-48 (1981)).

LAw OF BANK DEPosrrs,
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ary and typically chosen by the beneficiary." 135 Consequently,
although a confirming bank is usually concerned with maintaining a
good relationship with the other bank-the issuer-the confirming
bank's affinity with its own beneficiary tends to be stronger and thus
can cause the confirming bank to be "somewhat biased in favor of the
beneficiary. ' 136 Also, "the confirming bank is not in privity with the
ultimate customer, who would be most likely to become dissatisfied if
a conflict is resolved by the confirming bank.'1 37 As such, with respect to confirming banks, the court concluded that "it would be inequitable to let [them] exercise such discretion under a protective
umbrella of substantial compliance" because, unlike a triangular
transaction with just one bank-an issuer-there is no38 "safety mechanism" to inhibit "misuse" of the more lax standard.1
After concluding that the standard of strict compliance was controlling, the district court examined the ten enumerated discrepancies
between the documents and the letter of credit and found that Manufacturers had violated the rule of strict compliance with respect to two
of them.139 But, according to the court, Manufacturers' violation did
135. d.
136. Id; see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
137. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1539. See Dolan, Letter of CreditDisputes, supra note 32,
at 391-92, for a criticism of the Cochin court's analysis "that a strict rule better suits the
realities of the confirming bank/issuer relationship because the confirming bank is in the
beneficiary's market and is more likely to tilt toward the beneficiary in evaluating the documents." Id.
138. Cochin I, 612 F. Supp. at 1539. In Cochin I, the district court was also of the view
that the facts before it did not warrant the application of the looser standard because Manufacturers "was not faced with a 'cross-fire of pressures' or concern that a disgruntled 'customer' would refuse reimbursement because Cochin had sufficient funds on deposit with
[Manufacturers]." Id.
139. The first defect was "St. Lucia's cable to Oriental using the wrong covernote
number of 4291 instead of 429711." Id. at 1540. As the court explained, "[tihe failure to
provide the correct covernote was not inconsequential as the mistake could have resulted
in Oriental's justifiable refusal to honor Vishwa's insurance policy." Id. The court cited
Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 596 F. Supp. 438,442 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 4,5-6
(2d Cir. 1985), where "the Second Circuit affirmed the dishonor of a letter of credit on the
sole ground that the misspelling of Mohammed Sofan as Mohammed Soran on the bill of
lading constituted a material discrepancy." Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1540. The sixth defect was "that the payment was made on documents presented by St. Lucia Enterprises
despite the fact that the letter of credit was established for St. Lucia Enterprises, Ltd." Id.
at 1541. As the court explained, "[a]lthough there does not appear to be any difference
between the two entities, it is not clear that the 'intended' party was paid" and "[t]he
difference in names could also possibly be an indicia of unreliability or forgery." Id. The
court found "[t]he alleged noncompliance-with conditions (2), (3), (4), (8), (9) and (10) [to
be] unsupported" because the "provisions were not explicitly required by the letter of
credit." Id. at 1540-41. "The seventh alleged defect ... that only five copies of the documents, rather than six, were submitted to [Manufacturers]" was a "deviation... similar to a
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not end the case because the doctrines of equitable waiver and estoppel had to come into play.14 Although the court in Cochin acknowledged the case law on classic waiver and estoppel in letter of credit
transactions, it ultimately turned to the UCP's preclusion provision
and found it to be an absolute bar to Cochin's recovery for wrongful
honor. In so doing, the court explained:
The issuing bank must give notice "without delay" that the
documents received are (1) being "held at the disposal" of
the remitting or confirming bank or (2) "Are being returned"
to the second bank. An issuing bank that fails to return or
hold the documents for the second bank is precluded from
asserting that the negotiation and payment were not effected
in accordance with the letter of credit requirements. 4 '
Fixing on the language in Article 16, which gives the issuing bank
a reasonable time to examine the documents and "determine whether
to make such a claim," the court noted that neither the 1974 nor the
1983 versions of the UCP defined What constitutes a reasonable
time. 42 Also, neither version of the UCP defined notice "without delay. ' 143 The problem though, as the -court acknowledged, was that
both terms were crucial because the bank that does not satisfy them
walks right into the sting of the preclusion sanction. The district court,
however, noting that the UCC gives the issuer three banking days to
honor or reject a documentary draft for payment, simply engrafted the
UCC time frame onto the UCP's more open-ended deadline.'"
The district court concluded that Cochin had activated the preclusion sanction of the UCP in several respects: Cochin had failed to
"promptly notify [Manufacturers] that it had returned the documents
hypothetical error not affecting strict compliance." Id. at 1541 (quoting Beyene, 762 F.2d
at 6 ("Smith misspelled as Smithh")).
140. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1541.

141. Id. at 1542 (citations omitted).
142. Id.Article 13(b) of the 1993 revision of the UCP states that the "reasonable time"
must not "exceed seven banking days following the day of receipt of the documents." UCP
art. 13(b) (1993).
143. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1542. Article 14(d)(i) of the 1993 revision of the UCP
states that the refusal notice must be "no later than the close of the seventh banking day
following the day of receipt of the documents." UCP art. 14(d)(i) (1993).
144. The district court relied on the principle that "[w]hen the [UCP] is silent or ambiguous, analogous UCC provisions may be utilized if consistent with [the UCP]." Cochin I,
612 F. Supp. at 1542 (citing First Commercial Bank v. Gotham Originals, Inc., 475 N.E.2d
1255, 1259 n.4 (N.Y. 1985); United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 360
N.E.2d 943, 947 n.2 (N.Y. 1976); Eljay Jrs., Inc. v. Rahda Exports, 470 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14

(1984)).
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or that it was holding them at [Manufacturers's] disposal." 145 Also,
while Cochin's telex of June 21 stated that there were some discrepancies in St. Lucia's documents, "Cochin did not advise [Manufacturers]
that it was returning the documents... until the July 3 telex." 146 In
addition, because, as the court found, the three-day UCC period was
the "maximum" time for notification, and because June 21 was a Saturday, "Cochin should have complied with its notice obligations no
later than June 26."' 147 Thus, "[t]he passage of an additional week...14
preclude[d] Cochin from asserting its wrongful honor claim." 8
Cochin, moreover, did not specify any reason for its dishonor until
June 27 and omitted to mention one of the fatal variances until July
4.149

In an effort to dissuade the district court from treating Article 16
as such a rigid sanction, Cochin proposed an escape hatch in the form
of a causation or incurability theory. What Cochin urged upon the
court was that its failure to provide timely and adequate notice to
Manufacturers should not make it liable to Manufacturers because it
did not cause additional loss to Manufacturers.1 50 Specifically,
"Cochin argue[d] that the defects were in any case incurable by the
time Cochin received the documents, because St. Lucia had disappeared with the letter of credit proceeds." 151 In rejecting Cochin's
theory, the district court said:
Cochin's contention ignores the expectation in the international financial community that the parties will live up to
their statutory obligations and is at odds with the basic letter
of credit tenet that banks deal solely with documents, not in
goods. Cochin's argument would defeat the letter of credit's
function 2 of being a swift, fluid and reliable financing
15
device.
In its response to Cochin's position that it did not cause the loss,
or more timely notice on its part would not have prevented the loss,
the district court wove together three platitudes, all of which could
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id at 1542-43.
Id at 1543.
Id
Id
Id

150. Id
151. Id
152. Id (citing Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680,684-85
(2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting contention that waiver analysis was inappropriate because defects
were incurable)).
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just as well be twisted to favor Cochin. For example, it is likewise an
"expectation in the international financial community" that confirming banks-not just issuing banks-will "live up to their statutory obligations" by dishonoring documents that do not strictly comply with
the letter of credit.1 53 Also, the forgiving of a confirming bank that
fails to abide by the rule of strict compliance is indeed at odds with the
independence principle or the basic letter of credit tenet that banks
deal solely with documents, not in goods.154 In addition, the exoneration of the bank that violates the rule of strict compliance defeats "the
letter of credit's function of being a swift, fluid and reliable financing
device.""' 5
Although ostensibly rejecting Cochin's causation or incurability
theory, the district court actually injected that very theory of causation
or incurability into the heart of the analysis, but lodged it against
Cochin.1 56 The court opined that the two documentary discrepancies
that Cochin could have anticipated "were curable before the demand
for payment"157 and explained:
Cochin received a copy of [Manufacturers's] incorrect March
31 advice to St. Lucia, which mistakenly listed the insurance
covernote as 4291. Similarly, Cochin received copies of all of
[Manufacturers's] advices to St. Lucia, which omitted the
"Ltd." from the corporate name. Cochin had sufficient notice and time to correct [Manufacturers's] confirming defects
to St. Lucia and is therefore estopped from asserting them. 58
As such, according to the district court, the very theory it had apparently discarded-that of causation or curability-somehow did matter. Because, in the court's view, Cochin was the bank that could have
prevented the loss, it should also be the bank that has to bear the loss.
Consequently, the trial court decision in Cochin is a repugnant
paradox: Stated otherwise, in deeming the UCP's preclusion rule to
be well-suited for the certain and efficient resolution on summary
judgment, the district court purported to excise the factors of causation or curability from the inquiry. But, in its final analysis, that same
court actually reinsinuated such factors of causation or curability into
the inquiry and through use of those very factors, ended up branding
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
See id.
See id.
IdId. (emphasis added).
Id.
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Cochin, the issuing bank, the loser. In effect, the trial court issued
findings with respect to causation and curability and in essence rendered a verdict. All of this happened on summary judgment-that is,
without a trial.
B. - An Affirmance in the Second Circuit
In Cochin 11,159 the Second Circuit affirmed and concluded "that
Cochin's untimely notice constituted a waiver of its right to assert the
documents' noncompliance."' 16 What makes the appellate court's decision so significant, however, is not the result it reached, but four
aspects of its reasoning.
One, while the Second Circuit saw that there were really two separate time frames in whit was Article 16, the court refused to quantify
either one.' 6 ' As the court said, the UCP required Cochin:
(1) to examine the documents and determine, within a reasonable time, whether to make a claim that [Manufacturers's] payment was not in compliance with the terms of the
credit; and (2) without delay and usingexpeditious means, to
notify [Manufacturers] of the specific defects and to advise
[Manufacturers] of the disposition of the documents.' 62
In the Second Circuit's view, timeliness under the UCP's provisions entails a two-tiered analysis of: (1) the bank's examination of
the documents and decision of whether to claim improper payment
within a reasonable time; and (2) the bank's notification of defects
without delay through the use of expeditious means.1 63 The court,
however, expressly declined to approve the district court's approach
of engrafting the Uniform Commercial Code's three-days onto the
UCP.' That is, the appellate court simply determined that it did not
have to reach this issue because it could conclude that Cochin had
"failed to notify [Manufacturers] 'expeditiously' and 'without delay' of
specific defects and of the disposition of the documents.' ' 1 65

The Second Circuit's reluctance to impose a set time frame on the
examination of documents or on the issuance of the dishonor notifica159. Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir.
1986).
160. Id. at 211.
161. See id. at 212.

162. Id.

163. Id.
164. See id.
at 212-13.
165. Id. at 213.
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tion is quite.telling because in its approach, the court in effect imbued
the UCP's provisions with greater pliancy. Thus, reasonable is reasonable and without delay "connote[s] a sense of urgent action within the
shortest interval of time possible." 1 " Because, as the court determined, what it was facing was "a twelve to thirteen day period from
Cochin's initial inspection of the documents to its notification of the
noncomplying defect and its decision to return the documents to
[Manufacturers]" such a lapse of almost two weeks could not "be considered notification
'ivithout delay' under any reasonable definition of
167
phrase."
that
Two, the Second Circuit stated that "[iln this era of near instantaneous international communications, we can find no rationaleto justify Cochin's delay in informing [Manufacturers] of the specific defects
and of its intention to return the documents., 168 Albeit arguably
dicta, such language suggests that the rule of preclusion might not be
so absolutely automatic and that the imposition of the sanction might,
in some situations, require a court first to consider other factorsnamely, whether there was a 69
rationale or justification for a bank's denotification.
in
defect
or
lay
Three, the court also said that "[h]ad this information been imparted in a timely fashion, some part or all of the funds might have
been recovered before they were removed from St. Lucia's Citibank
account."' 70 Although ostensibly treating Article 16's sanction as one
automatically barring the recovery of a bank that fails to provide
timely or adequate notice, the court nevertheless acknowledged that
causation or curability are indeed relevant. 71
166. Id. The Second Circuit said that the "phrase is akin to 'immediate (at once), instant, instantaneous, instantly, prompt."' Id. (quoting W. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS

1053 (1980)).
167. Id

168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. See Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 824-25 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that "reasonable time" was not automatically three-day period in § 5112 of UCC and that fifteen banking days was reasonable where presenter repeatedly requested issuer to ask applicant to waive discrepancies); Barnes & Byrne, supra note 33, at
1636-37; see also Donna L. Salerno, Note, Commercial Law-Letters of Credit-Discrepant Documents Submitted on an Approval Basis Under a Letter of Credit May Be Dishonored If IssuingBank Acts on Beneficiary's Demandfor Payment Within a Reasonable 7ime
Under Uniform Customs and Practicesfor Documentary Credits, Article 16(c)-Alaska
Textile Co., Inc., v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992), 23 SnroN
HALL L. REv. 1253 (1993) (discussing 16(c) as construed in Alaska Textile).
170. See Cochin II, 808 F2d at 213.
171. See id at 212-13.
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Four, the court appeared to suggest that the respective culpability
of the banks should also figure into the calculus. 172 As the court
explained:
Cochin was at all times in the best position to learn of the
fraudulent nature of St. Lucia's activities and to prevent payment of the funds. Its failure to take advantage of that position, in spite of several opportunities to do so, resulted in the
loss it seeks to charge to [Manufacturers] here.1 73
Taken as a whole, the Second Circuit decision suggests that in a
rectangular dispute, the determi'nation of which bank should bear the
loss is not and should not be merely a matter of mechanically counting
days or picking at the minutia in a bank's dishonor notification. In
fact, according to the Second Circuit in Cochin 11, the flexibility of
standards like reasonable or without delay or expeditious should remain perfectly in tact. After Cochin H, liability in the rectangular dispute involves not just a consideration of whether there is a "rationale
to justify" a delay or omission, but also an analysis of whether the
delay or omission caused the loss. 17 4 Also, after Cochin HI, there
should be an assessment of which of the banks was the more culpable
party, or stated otherwise, which bank was in the best position to prevent the loss. 175
C. Certainty and Efficiency After Cochin
Professor Dolan perceived an incongruity in Cochin I between
"the language of the district court opinion" which "flatly requires the
confirming bank to follow the strict-compliance standard of the beneficiary relationship when it pursues its claim against the opening
bank," and the actual "result" of Cochin I, which "is to give the confirming bank reimbursement even though it pays over nonconforming
documents[.] 176 Dolan elaborated:
In short, Bank of Cochin, using estoppel, fashions an exception to the very rule it says it is establishing. To that extent,
the case is consistent with many others and supports the conclusion that by paying attention to what the courts do rather
172. See id. at 213.

173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id.; Farrar, Letters of Credit (1987), supra note 33, at 1313 ("As the court noted,
had Bank of Cochin timely notified [Manufacturers], some of the funds diverted by the
admittedly fraudulent beneficiary might have been recovered in time. Accordingly, the
party who could have prevented the loss must accept the consequences.").
176. Dolan, Letter-of-Credit Disputes, supra note 32, at 389-90.
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than what they say yields the rule that this article advocates-a rule that determines the issuer or confirming bank's
right of reimbursement from facts other than the ilature of
documentary compliance. 77
Really though, after the appellate decision in Cochin H, the incongruity disappears and what the appellate court actually did and
what it said congeals. On the broadest level, the Second Circuit's simultaneous adherence to the rule of strict compliance and willingness
to allow a bank to 'absent itself from the rigors of that very rule is an
implicit acknowledgement that certain and efficient rules and procedures cannot and should not be doggedly unyielding. Such an implication, however, embraces not just the rule of strict compliance, which is
only one rule of certainty and efficiency, but also the other putatively
certain and efficient creation-namely, the UCP's preclusion sanction. In this regard, the Second Circuit has indicated that particular
disputes can and will arise-disputes that, by their very natures, resist
the certain and efficient summary judgment mechanism.
In Cochin I, the district court had found the law to be "sufficiently chartered to require summary judgment for [the confirming
bank]" and remarked that "[l]etter of credit liability cases are particularly appropriate for judicial resolution without trial because they
present solely legal issues.""17 In its reasoning, however, the Second
Circuit proposed an exception to that very proposition by delineating
four attributes of a letter of credit liability case, any one of which
could conceivably make the case come out another

way.

17 9

That is,

the Second Circuit foresaw a rectangular case, which could require
summary judgment for the other bank-the issuer-or at least, could
be a dispute that is particularly inappropriate for judicial resolution
without trial.
First, the effect of the Second Circuit's refusal to "decide whether
a three-day time period should be read into the [UCP]" was to leave
the UCP's "reasonable time requirement" as is.' 80 One of the most
177. Id. at 390.
178. Cochin I, 612 F. Supp. at 1537.
179. See Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213.
180. Id. While Article 13(b) of the 1993 revision of the UCP specifies that "reasonable
time" does not "exceed seven banking days following the day of receipt of the documents[,]" a bank that uses all seven days is not necessarily acting within a "reasonable
time." See DOCUMENTARY CRDnrs: UCP 500 & 400 CoMAREiD 40 (CC Publishing S.A.
Paris, 1993) [hereinafter DocuMENTARY CREDrrs] ("[Jiust because a bank now has a limit
not to exceed seven days following the day of receipt of the documents, to examine the
documents and determine whether to take up or refuse the documents does not mean that
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basic propositions, however, is that "[t]he reasonableness of a period
of time-except as to extremes-[is] a classic issue for the trier of
fact." 181 Thus, what Cochin indicates is that some delays-like the
twelve- or thirteen-day period in Cochin-are so excessive that they
are simply unreasonable as a matter of law.18 Where, however, the
lapse of time between the receipt of the documents and the decision
to dishonor is quite short, that period could instead be deemed reasonable as a matter of law. 183 In such cases, the question of reasonait is prudent, reasonable, or even proper for a bank to take all of that time to examine the
documents and determine whether to accept or refuse such documents.").
181. Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 702
(1st Cir. 1978). In Flagship,the court found that the reasonableness of delay in presenting
the letter of credit is generally an issue for the trier of fact. See id.at 702-03, 705; see also
Timber Falling Consultants, Inc. v. General Bank, 751 F. Supp. 179, 183-84 (D. Or. 1990)
(holding that beneficiary "presented evidence which creates a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether [the] [blank gave notice to [the beneficiary] ... and whether any such
notice was adequate and timely under Article 16."). Other courts, declining to apply the
preclusion provision mechanically, have found that compliance with various requirements
of Article 16 of the UCP presents questions of fact. Se4 eg., Offshore Iading Co. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 650 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987) (stating that whether bank
gave beneficiary notice of nonconformity constituted genuine issue of material fact).
182. In Kuntal, S.A. v. Bank of New York, 703 F. Supp. 312, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), decided in the wake of Cochin I, the district court, entering final summary judgment for the
confirming bank, found that the issuing bank's failure to comply with Article 16 was a
waiver of its objections to the discrepancies in the documents. In Kuntal, the bank received the documents on February 19,1987, and gave notice of its refusal on March 4,1987.
1d. at 312-13. The plaintiff characterized this as a two-week delay, and the bank took the
position that it was a nine-day delay because it "examined the submitted documents two
business days later on February 23, 1987" and gave notice nine days after that on March 4,
1987. Id. at 313. The court, however, stated that for the purposes of the memorandum, it
would accept the bank's characterization. Id. at 314 n.3; see also Auto Servicio San Ignacio, S.R.L. v. Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion, 765 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th
Cir. 1985) (holding that "the one to two year hiatus" between time that documents were
submitted to procure payment and time that issuing bank raised claim of nonconformity
was, as matter of law, unreasonable); Integrated Measurement Sys., Inc. v. International
Commercial Bank of China, 757 F. Supp. 938, 947 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (precluding bank from
arguing nonconformity where it gave notice 20 days after receipt of documents and five
days after credit had expired so that beneficiary was precluded from curing defects); Petra
Int'l Banking Corp. v. First Am. Bank, 758 F. Supp. 1120, 1128 (E.D. Va. 1991) (precluding
issuing bank from raising nonconformity more than one year after receipt of documents).
183. In Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v. Continental Bank N.A., 918 F.2d 1312 (7th
Cir. 1990), aff'g 725 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the district court applied the UCC to the
UCP and found that "banks [had] three business days to review the documents." Id. at
1318. The district court entered a final summary judgment for the bank because, inter alia,
the bank's decision to dishonor the draw, made within three days of receipt of the documents, and its decision not to notify the beneficiaries until the next business day "was
reasonable under the circumstances." Id. In affirming the final summary judgment for the
bank, the Seventh Circuit stated:Indeed, it is entirely possible that the [UCPJ would allow an issuing bank more
than three business days to review draw documents under some circum-
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bleness could alternatively be deemed one of fact, which a court could
not resolve on summary judgment.
Second, the appellate court said that "[it could] find no rationale
to justify Cochin's delay in informing [Manufacturers] of the specific
defects and of its intention to return the documents." 1" Such language embraces the possibility that in a rectangular dispute, the bank
that provides an untimely or inadequate dishonor notification could
nevertheless prevail. At the very least, the Second Circuit has foreseen a situation where such a bank, although derelict in its Article 16
duties, could be deemed entitled to have the trier of fact decide
whether there is a rationale to justify its delayed or defective dishonor
notification.
Third, the Second Circuit said that had the "information been imparted in a timely"fashion, some part or all of the funds might have
stances.... Certainly, the issuing bank is not required to drop everything-including other letter of credit draw submissions-just because a beneficiary has
decided to delay submitting a draw until less than a week before the letter of
credit expires. Thus, the district court did not err as a matter of law when it
concluded that [issuer] had three business days to review the joint draw, nor did it
err as a matter of fact in finding, that [issuer] acted reasonably under the
circumstances.
IL at 1318 n3; see also discussion in Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra note 32,
at 1627-29 (discussing whether reasonable time can be construed as less than statutory
three-day period).
In Penfli Industries, Inc. v. Bank of China New York Branch, No. 90 CIV. 1115
(RLC), 1990 WL 89339 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1990), the district court actually approved a
lapse of four business days from receipt of the documents to notification. The bank had
made its determination to reject payment "some three days after receipt of the documents"
and the court found this to meet the reasonable time requirement of the UCP. Id. at *1.
The court then went on to state that "[i]f [the bank] is believed, however, the 'delay' between [its decision to reject the] documents and the notification of the rejection was one
day or less. Such swift action would undoubtedly satisfy Article 16(d)." Id. at *2. As such,
the district court in Penfli indicated that three business days to decide whether to accept or
reject the documents plus one business day to provide notification is well within the parameters of timely notice; see also discussion in Givray et al., Letters of Credit (1991), supra
note 32, at 1630-31 (determining-whether dishonor notice was given to beneficiary without
delay).
In Datapoint Corp. v. M & I Bank, 665 F. Supp. 722,727 (W.D. Wis. 1987), although
the bank received the draft one day before the letter of credit was to expire, it sent the
notice of dishonor by mail and it was not received until three days after the expiration
date. This lapse of four days, along with the bank's choice of using the mail, was deemed
unreasonable because it deprived the recipient of a chance to cure the defect. Id.; see also
Integrated Measurement Sys., 757 F. Supp. at 947 ("[The [UCP] might allow more than
three business days ... ."). Under the 1993 revision of the UCP, a very short period could
be deemed "unreasonable." See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
184. Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213; see also Kuntal, 703 F. Supp. at 314 ("In the absence of
any persuasive and reasonable justification for the Bank's ... delay following its examination of the documents.... the delay waived the issuing bank's right to object to [the]
discrepancies .... ).
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been recovered before they were removed from St. Lucia's Citibank
account." 1 5s In so doing, what the Second Circuit accomplished was
the endorsement of loss causation or curability as pertinent factors in
such a rectangular dispute, which arose out of a beneficiary having
perpetrated a fraud on both banks.
In Cochin I, the district court cited a Second Circuit decision,
Voest-Alpine InternationalCorp. v. Chase ManhattanBank, N.A.,186 to
bolster its ostensible decision not to consider causation or curability.
In truth, however, the Voest-Alpine case was entirely inapposite. Specifically, the court in Voest-Alpine did not espouse the proposition that
courts should ignore the futility of more timely notice or more specific
notice when a fraud has been perpetrated and the notice is to go from
one bank to another.
Voest-Alpine involved the more typical triangular transaction, in
which a beneficiary sued the bank for wrongful dishonor and argued
that the bank had waived its objections to the defects in the documents by approving them.1 7 The Second Circuit rejected the bank's
contention that as a matter of law, the "incurability of [the] defect
defeats any possibility of waiver." ' In reversing the final summary
judgment for the bank, the Second Circuit defined the factual dispute
in Voest-Alpine as whether the bank had acted in such a way as to
intentionally relinquish its right to insist that the beneficiary strictly
comply with the letter of credit.1 89 In so doing, however, the Second
Circuit determined that the curability of the defect has no bearing on
whether the bank committed acts of waiver1 9°
The Voest-Alpine case was really a red herring with respect to the
Cochin matter and had no bearing whatsoever on the theory that
Cochin was urging on the district court. What Cochin had tried to
persuade the district court was that "by the time [it had] received the
documents,...

St. Lucia had disappeared with the letter of credit

proceeds" and thus because the fraud had already been consummated,
its own failure to timely notify Manufacturers "caused no additional
loss."' 19 1 While the bank in Voest-Alpine was talking about the incurability of defects in the documents, the bank in Cochin was talking
about the incurability of a loss caused by fraud.
185. Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213.
186. 707 F.2d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1983).

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 683-84.
Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1543.
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Also, Voest-Alpine did not involve the rectangular battle between
the banks. As discussed above, in the rectangular transaction, the
UCP notice provisions have an additional function. As we said, it is
frequently the case that a confirming bank is a "local firm in cahoots
with the beneficiary."'" Since the confirming bank "is usually in relatively close geographical proximity with the beneficiary and typically
chosen by the beneficiary because of past dealings[,]" it tends to be
"somewhat biased in favor of the beneficiary."' 93 Consequently, the
UCP notice provisions aim to encourage the issuing bank to be vigilant and to try to prevent a confirming bank from incurring loss or
effectually rewarding a defrauder through improper acceptance of a
beneficiary's fraudulent demand for payment. As such, once a confirming bank enters the triangle, the rules have to, and do indeed,
change a little. In this context, what was Article 16 and is now
predominantly Article 14 induces the issuing bank to become an overseer or watchdog and exert some control over the transaction in a
distant land between a local bank and a local beneficiary.
The Second Circuit in Cochin II, by finding that curability is relevant, underscores the inapplicability of Voest-Alpine. As such, the
Second Circuit indicates that where there is a perpetration of a fraud
and the confirming bank has wrongfully paid out on the fraudulent
documents and a rejection notice is to go from the issuing bank to the
confirming bank, the futility of more timely or more specific notice
should indeed be a factor in determining which bank should bear the
loss.' 94 The Second Circuit suggests at least that in some instances,
the issuing bank should have the chance to show to the trier of fact
that its notice was expeditious enough or detailed enough because
more expeditious or more detailed notice would not have changed a
95
thing.
192. Banque Paribas v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 1985); see
also supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing letter of credit transactions
which have rectangular configurations).
193. Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1539.
194. See discussion of causation as an issue not susceptible to summary judgment in Eric
K. Yamamoto et al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads: The Impact of the Celotex
Trilogy, 12 U. HAW. L. Rv. 1, 14-15 (1990).
195. In various disputes involving letters of credit, federal courts typically consider
whether proper notice would have served any purpose. See, e.g., Marino Indus. Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that by not returning documents until after letter had expired, bank made it impossible for beneficiary to
correct any deficiencies and still make timely presentation); Crist v. J. Henry Schroder
Bank & Trust Co., 693 F. Supp. 1429,1432 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[E]ven if the Bank chose
a less than expeditious means of notifying the Receiver, the Receiver's rights were not
prejudiced by that choice, because by then it could do nothing to remedy the nonconform-
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Fourth, the Second Circuit stressed that Cochin was the bank "in
the best position to learn of the fraudulent nature of St. Lucia's activities-and to prevent-payment of the funds" and that Cochin's "failure
to take advantage of that position, in spite of several opportunities to
do so, resulted in the loss it [sought] to charge to [Manufacturers]
here.' 1 96 What this language suggests is that the UCP's rule of preclusion might not spell an automatic victory for one miscreant bank and
demise for the other. Instead, causation or curability of loss is integral
to the process of ascertaining which of the two banks is the more culpable. Consequently, according to the Cochin court, a form of comparative fault can and does enter into the decision of which bank will
ultimately have to pay. Here too, the Second Circuit suggests that in
some cases, the issuing bank should, at least, be given the chance to
persuade the trier of fact that the confirming bank was in thd best
position to prevent fraud and that the confirming bank nevertheless
failed to prevent fraud and thus, ipse dixit, the confirming bank should
be the one that has to pay.
It is interesting that Professor Dolan maintains that in situations
such as that in Cochin, "the issuer or confirming bank's right to reimbursement" should be determined "from facts other than the nature
of documentary compliance."' 197 That is, what Dolan advances is that
assessing the "relative liability between the issuer and its customer...
should turn not on the nature of the documentary breach but on its
consequences and on the bona fides of the issuer."' 198

While Dolan advocates a minor erosion of the certain and efficient rule of strict compliance, the present author advocates a similar
erosion of the certain and efficient UCP's preclusion rule. And, in
fact, such an erosion is most appropriate in a rectangular case, such as
Cochin, where the rules of strict compliance and preclusion collide. In
ity that the Bank thought it had found in the sight drafts."); DatapointCorp., 665 F. Supp.
at 727 (precluding bank from claiming that draft varied from terms of letter where
"[c]ommon experience would have suggested that it was unlikely that [beneficiary] would
receive [the] notice in time to correct the variance").
196. Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213. Some courts have determined that where a bank facilitates a fraud by knowingly accepting forged documents, it is liable even if it did not benefit
from the fraudulent scheme. See, for example, Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion
Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Must Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 281
(N.D. IIl. 1982), and cases cited therein. In Instituto, the district court found that although
a customer failed to state objections to nonconforming documents within 10 days, as required by Illinois law, it was not barred from pursuing its claims against the bank which
accepted forged documents. Id at 281-82.
197. Dolan, Letter-of-CreditDisputes, supra note 32, at 390.

198. Id.at 381.
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its reasoning, the Second Circuit in Cochin, effectually ratifies precisely such an approach. Although the specific facts of Cochin justified the imposition of liability on the issuing bank, the Second Circuit
conjures up a hypothetical case, one in which an issuing bank should
escape liability even though it has failed to fulfill what are its UCP's
notification obligations. As such, the Second Circuit envisions a fact
pattern, which would justify shifting the liability to the confirming
bank that violated the rule of strict compliance. In essence, the Second Circuit in Cochin spawned the contours of Cochin's alter ego by
anticipating four factors that could present themselves in such a rectangular dispute, any one or combination of which, could make the
battle between the banks come out the other way. At least, the Second Circuit envisioned a rectangular letter of credit case, which could
survive the certain and efficient summary judgment motion.
IV.

CERTAINTY AND EFFICIENCY AFTER

Banque de l'Union

Haiienne
A.

Summary Judgment in the District Court

Banque de l'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. ManufacturersHanover InternationalBanking Corp.,199 another dispute arising in a rectangular
transaction, is Cochin's doppelganger.
The Banque problem began when Banque de l'Union Haitienne
(Union Bank) issued-a letter of credit in favor of its customer°, Eleck
S.A. (Eleck) in the amount of $1,400,000.2 ° On the same day, Manufacturers Hanover (Manufacturers) agreed not only to act as the advising, confirming, and paying bank in the transaction, but also that
the UCP would govern its relationship with Union Bank.2°1 After
several amendments, the letter of credit had an expiration date of
April 30, 1989, and then due to an assignment, the final beneficiary
became International Basic Economic Co. (IBEC).3 2
On April 19, 1989, IBEC first presented documents to Manufacturers for payment.2 °' Manufacturers's employees, however, determined that the documents did not conform to the terms and
199. 787 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd per curiam, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992)
(opinion on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
200. Id. at 1418.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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conditions of the letter of credit and thus properly rejected that initial
payment. 2°4
Manufacturers did not inform Union Bank of IBEC's first attempted presentment, but instead Union Bank found out about it the
next day from its own customer, Eleck. 5 Consequently, on April 20,
Union Bank, itself taking the initiative, telexed Manufacturers and
asked it to specify what discrepancies had led to the first rejection of
the documents.m2 On April 21, although Manufacturers sent a telex,
it basically just told Union Bank that IBEC was going to try again on
April 24.2w3 Manufacturers, however, did not identify any particular
defects in the IBEC documents. Union Bank did not receive this telex
until April 24, 1989.208
When IBEC tried for payment again on April 21, Manufacturers
again rejected the documents because they failed to meet the terms
and conditions of the letter of credit.2° Then on April 24, IBEC
made still another presentation and again Manufacturers turned away
IBEC because of discrepancies between the documents and the requirements of the letter of credit.210
After the third aborted presentation, IBEC decided to try again
later the same day, but this time IBEC sought out a different Manufacturers's employee, one who had not been involved in any of the
three previous rejections. 211 This time, however, the ploy worked and
the employee accepted IBEC's documents.212 After acceptance, Manufacturers transferred the money to 1BEC's account at another bank
in Miami, Florida and debited Union Bank's account at Manufacturers for the same amount. 213 On the following day, when IBEC wire
transferred the money overseas, the IBEC principals disappeared, and
so did the money.21 4 As it turned out, the documents that IBEC had
presented to Manufacturers were fraudulent. 15
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
1& at 1418-19.
1d at 1419.
Id.
AL
Id
Id
Id
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After paying on the letter of credit, Manufacturers sent the documents over to Union Bank 216 Although Manufacturers claimed that
Union Bank received the documents on April 26, Union Bank
claimed that it did not receive them until April 27.217 Either date,
however, was undisputedly after the IBEC principals and the money
had vanished.
In the Banque case, there was a dispute over exactly when Union
Bankfirst notified Manufacturers of its belief that the documents that
IBEC had presented had discrepancies. Specifically, Union Bank
claimed to have provided Manufacturers with notice by telephone on
May 5. Manufacturers, however, claimed-that Union Bank did not
notify it until May 8, which was the day Manufacturers had received
Union Bank's telex.21 8
After Union Bank sued Manufacturers for damages for Manufacturers's wrongful honor, both parties moved for summary judgment.
Although Union Bank's complaint listed several discrepancies, allegedly existing in the documents, the district court determined that the
dispute really centered around two: First, as Union Bank claimed, the
document "was neither visaed nor stamped by the Haitian Consulate
in Miami"; and second, "IBEC did not make a proper presentment of
an insurance certificate to Manufacturers. 2 1 9 One of the impediments, however, was that Union Bank's May 8, 1989, telex delineated
only two discrepancies that were not, as the district court concluded,
required by the letter of credit.P ° Also, the telex failed to state
"whether Union Bank was holding the documents at the disposal of
Manufacturers or was returning the documents to it."2 2
216. Id.

217. I&
218. The May 8,1989, telex pointed to two discrepancies, which, according to the district
court "were not required by the letter of credit." Id. As the court elaborated:
First, the telex stated that the original of an all risks insurance policy was not
submitted and second, that the legalization of the consular invoice was made in
Miami rather than in the port of shipment. The letter of credit merely required,
however, the presentation of copies of the insurance policy and did not specify
the location for the consularization.

Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. The May 8, 1989, telex stated:
Your ref. 6-29956 our LC 3445 USD 1,400,000.00 documents received showing
following discrepancies. 1) Original of insurance policy not presented 2) Onsu-

lar invoiclrrgd [sic] and legalized in Miami instead of in port of shipment Stop We
express our reserves in this context
Id. at 1419 n.1.
221. Id. at 1419-20.
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The district court said that it was well settled that the rule of strict
compliance governs the UCP's Article 15 and that "a confirming bank
(Manufacturers) owes the same duty of reasonable care to the issuing
bank (Union Bank) and that it is accountable to the issuer for imManufacturers's defense was based, however, on
proper payment."'
the rule of preclusion or as Manufacturers stated, that even assuming
that it had violated the rule of strict compliance and that "such discare,...
crepancies would have been detected by using reasonable
223
Article 16 of the UCP alone disposes of this case."
The district court, agreeing with Manufacturers, focused on what
it viewed as Union Bank's Article 16 violation:
Union Bank failed in its obligations to Manufacturers by first
not giving notice "without delay" by expeditious means of its
decision to dishonor and second, by not stating whether it
was holding or returning the documents. Although Union
Bank received the documents on or about April 27, three
days before the letter was to expire, its first documented
communication to Manufacturers informing Defendant of
the alleged defects was by telex on May 8, eight days after
the expiration of the letter and eleven days after receipt of
such documents. Moreover, the telex claims only two defects
(which were not actually required by the letter) and it failed
to contain any statement regarding the fate of the
documents. 224
The district court found that "[e]ven if ...

Union Bank's first

notification was made by telephone on May 5 rather than May 8, that
date was the fifth business (and eighth calendar) day after the date
Union Bank states that it received the documents." 22 The court, like
the district court in Cochin I, also determined that the three-day period contained in the Uniform Commercial Code was controlling 6
222. Id. at 1420 (citing Banque Paribas v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d 380 (7th
Cir. 1985); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola v. Continental IlI. Nat'l Bank
& Thist Co., 530 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).
223. 1&
224. Id.at 1421.
225. 1d.
226. The district court in Banque stated that "[the] purported telephone call [was] still
too late given the three-day rule set forth in U.C.C. § 5-112 as the maximum 'reasonable
time' period in which to give notice." Id. (citing Cochin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1543). However, telephonic notice is permissible under the UCP. See, e.g., Occidental Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Continental Bank, N.A., 918 F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1990). Under some circumstances, federal courts have actually required it. See, e.g., Datapoint Corp. v. M & I Bank,
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and further found that the "call could not be considered 'expeditious'
since Union Bank allowed the credit to expire."'
Union Bank apparently tried to persuade the district court that
the situation in Banque contrasted with that in Cochin. As part of this
effort, Union Bank urged upon the court the causation or incurability
theory. Union Bank thus asserted that, unlike the situation in Cochin,
"by the time [it] received notice of the wrongful payment, the damage
had already been done and there was nothing that could have been
accomplished by notice from Union."'
Specifically, as Union Bank
pointed out, by the time it had received the fraudulent documents
from Manufacturers, payment had been made and the defrauders and
the funds were already gone. 2 9
To support its position, Union Bank relied on what it defined as
"the true purpose served by the notice provisions of Article 16,"
which purpose is "to allow the beneficiary an opportunity to cure the
discrepancies prior to the expiration of the [credit]." 2 0 From there,
Union Bank urged the trial court to conclude that the purpose behind
Article 16 "[was] not served in the instant case because no matter how
quickly or what type of notice Union Bank might have given Manufacturers, there .was no possibility that the defects could have been
cured." 23
Although agreeing that " 'curing a defect' may well be a purpose
under Article 16," the district court determined that "where the beneficiary is the presenter, it is surely not the only purpose."' 2 While the
court stated that "Union's 'usefulness of notice' argument ha[d] been
clearly rejected.., by the Second Circuit in Cochin," the court quoted
not from the Second Circuit decision, but from the district court decision in Cochin I.P3 The district court in Banque also did not acknowledge the fact that the Second Circuit had not rejected, but actually
adopted, the "usefulness of notice" assertion as one that could con665 F. Supp. 722, 727 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (holding telephonic notice is required so beneficiary has time to cure defects).
227. Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1421.
228. Id. at 1422.
229. Id.at 1419.
230. Id at 1422.
231. Id. at 1423.
232. Id.
233. Id. The district court also stated that the Eleventh Circuit in Pro-Fab, Inc. v. Vipa,
Inc., 772 F.2d 847, 854 (11th Cir. 1985), had also rejected the "usefulness of notice" argument. Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1423.
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ceivably bring about the acquittal of the bank that fails to comply with
Article 16P 4
Union Bank, moreover, sought to distinguish itself from the issuer in Cochin by suggesting that in the circumstances of Banque, it
was the confirming bank that was, in fact, more culpable. What Union
Bank stressed was that "four days before Manufacturers disbursed the
funds, Union [had] asked Manufacturers why it had previously rejected the documents."23 5 Manufacturers, however, had shunned the
question by omitting to specify the discrepancies and by merely providing a hollow retort that the "'documents [were] presented with
some discrepancies.' ",236 As Union Bank argued, "it may have discovered the fraud had Manufacturers advised Union of the discrepancies early on." 37
The district court dismissed Union Bank's argument by stating
that "Manufacturers owed no duty to inform Union of the reasons
why Manufacturers rejected a demand for payment made to it, or
even that a demand for payment had been made." 38 Such reasoning,
however, is disturbingly cavalier. That is, while there is no specific
mandate in the UCP that the confirming bank answer an issuing
bank's questions, there is likewise no provision in the UCP or the
UCC that forbids a confirming bank from disclosing information to
the issuer.
In addition, Union Bank pointed out that Manufacturers, unlike
the confirming bank in Cochin, was in the best position to learn of the
fraud and to prevent payment, and that it-Union Bank-unlike the
234. Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1423.
235. Id. at 1422.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The district court cited Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230,
237 (5th Cir. 1983), and Five Star Parking v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 703 F. Supp. 20
(E.D. Pa. 1989), for this proposition. Neither case, however, dealt with a dispute between
an issuing bank and a confirming bank. In PhiladelphiaGear, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
beneficiary's argument that under Louisiana law, the issuing bank "possessed an unqualified duty to notify it of the precise defects within its drafts and that absent such notice
liability must attach." 717 F.2d at 237. In Five StarParking, the district court determined
that neither state law nor the letter of credit required the issuing bank to notify a customer
before allowing the beneficiary to draw upon a letter of credit. 703 F. Supp. at 21-22.
While neither Philadelphia Gear nor Five Star Parking held that a confirming bank
has an obligation to communicate problems to the issuing bank, such a refusal to communicate is unreasonable in light of the fact that courts have recognized that confirming banks
"may be... local firm[s] in cahoots with the beneficiary" and that doctrines, like the rule
of strict compliance, aim "'to minimize the likelihood that a fraudulent demand for payment will be made and accepted." Banque Paribas v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d
380, 384 (7th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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issuer in Cochin, did not have "knowledge of the document discrepancies .. .before the documents were presented to the confirming
bank."'

9

Thus, as Union Bank asserted, what made the issuer in

Cochin the more culpable party was that it "took no action in spite of
the fact that it had an opportunity to do so."24 0 Union Bank, however,
"was never made aware of any of the defects before payment was
made" and thus, unlike Cochin, had simply no opportunity to take any
action. 241 The district court, apparently relegating such an argument
into the same category as causation or usefulness of notice, just summarily brushed it aside. 2
The district court concluded by extolling the UCP's "vital policy
of promoting certainty in letter of credit transactions."'2 43 The court
also elaborated on how Union Bank's theory that the "confirming
bank [be required to] establish a loss as a result of the issuing bank's
failure to fulfill its Article 16 obligation" was tantamount to an emasculation of heroic certainty and efficiency. 244
[I]f an issuing bank can avoid the preclusion penalty in such
a fashion, not only would Article 16 be stood on its head, but
the certainty essential to letter of credit operations would be
frustrated. Indeed, if we were to rule in Union Bank's favor
today, this would defeat the letter of credit's function of being a swift, fluid and reliable financing device and would ignore the expectation in the international financial
community that parties will fulfill their statutory duties.
Such a decision would invite issuers to disregard their duties
and prove in court that "their" case is excepted from Article
16 because there was nothing they could have done to cure
the loss.245
In sum, apparently persuaded that if it abided by Union Bank's
position, it could have a "harmful effect" on the certain and efficient
"system as a whole," the district court gave Manufacturers a judgment
as a matter of law. 24
239. Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1423.

240. Id.
241. I

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id. at 1424.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. An Affirmance in the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court and in an unpublished decision, provided:
The judgment of the district court is affirmed for the reasons
stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order of Summary
Judgment entered on February 27,1991. We note on page 12
of that opinion an adoption of the "three-day rule" discussed
in Cochin [I]. We do not adopt such a rigid rule and find it
unnecessary to establish a precise period of time. We agree,
however, that the notice given in this matter by Union Bank
did not satisfy the "without delay" requirement of Article
16(d) of the UCP. In all other regards, we agree with the
reasoning of the district court.24 7
What is interesting is that the Eleventh Circuit views itself as perfectly aligned with the Second Circuit. But while the Eleventh Circuit
agrees with the Second Circuit that timeliness under Article 16 of the
UCP does not entail the mere tallying of three days, the similarity
ends there. That is, in its reasoning, the Second Circuit had envisioned a rectangular dispute in which a confirming bank honors nonconforming documents and the issuing bank that fails to comply with
Article 16 nevertheless either prevails or survives summary judgment.
Although the Banque case is the Second Circuit's hypothetical in the
flesh, Union Bank-the issuing bank-neither prevails nor survives
summary judgment.24
C. Certainty and Efficiency after Banque
What Cochin giveth, Banque taketh away. As previously stated,
the Second Circuit in Cochin II described four attributes of a rectangular dispute, any one or combination of which would require either
summary judgment for the issuer or at least be deemed inappropriate
for judicial resolution without trial.249 " Banque has all four of these
attributes.
247. Banque de l'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l Banking Corp.,
787 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd per curiam, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted) (opinion on fie with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
248. Despite the faulty analysis of both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit in
Banque; few.commentators have even mentioned the case and those that have treat it as
just another case applying the UCP's Article 16 preclusion to nonconforming presentations. See, e.g., Barnes & Byrne, supra note 33, at 1637 n.16.
249. Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 212-13.
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First, in rejecting a set time frame for Article 16, the Second Circuit in Cochin II left the reasonable time standard intact." 0 Because
it is apodictic that the "reasonableness of a period of time-except as
J "'
to extremes-[is] ... a classic issue for the trier of fact[,]
the Second Circuit implicitly acknowledged that the reasonableness of some
lapses of time could present a question of fact.
We know, however, from Cochin II that a twelve- to thirteen-day
period from inspection to notification does not satisfy the reasonableness or without delay requirements as a matter of law.5 2 Also implicit in the Cochin II decision is a sense that a lapse of more than
three days can in some instances satisfy the UCP's timeliness provision. 53 In Banque, Union Bank had argued that it had given notice
on May 5 and Manufacturers said that notice had occurred on May
8.254 This period, which amounts toa lapse of five to eight business
days after receipt of the documents, could be reasonable and without
delay as a matter of law and at least present a factual issue.
Second, in Cochin II, the Second Circuit said that on these facts
there could be "no rationale to justify [the issuer's] delay."'' 5 What
such language acknowledges is the possibility that an issuing bank,
although providing untimely or even inadequate dishonor notification,
might nevertheless prevail in such a dispute with a confirming bank.
250. Id. at 212. Under Article 13(b) of the 1993 revision of the UCP, the reasonable
time standard still exists, but it has a cap of seven banking days following the day of receipt
of the documents. If one of the benefits of quantifying the time frame is to promote certainty, then the 1993 revision has not accomplished that goal. That is, a bank that does not
take the full seven banking days may still be deemed unreasonable. See DOCUMENTARY
CREDrrs, supra note 180, at 41 ("UCP 500 sub-Article 13(b) considers a reasonable time to
be still a reasonable time (whether one hour or several days, depending on the individual
transaction) subject to a maximum of seven banking days following the day of receipt of
the documents."). While the 1993 revision retains the supposedly inefficient reasonableness inquiry for time frames of less than the seven banking days, it precludes the conceivably fair determination that a bank that exceeded the seven banking days acted reasonably.
Cf id. at 40-41 ("Among other criteria on which reasonableness depends are the circumstances of presentation, the type and the value of documents. At one end of the spectrum
one may encounter an examination of hundreds of documents. This examination could
consume every hour of the seven-day period."). As such, the 1993 revision has both drawbacks-inefficiency and unfairness.
251. Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 702
(1st Cir. 1978); see supra note 181.
252. Cochin 11, 808 F.2d at 213.
253. See Dolan, Letter-of-Credit Dispu(es, supra note 32, at 389-90.
254. Banque de l'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l Banking Corp.,
787 F. Supp. 1416, 1419 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd per curiam, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992)
(opinion on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
255. Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213.
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In Banque, it is reasonable to conclude that Manufacturers's adtions were what impaired Union Bank's ability to discover the
problems before the wrongful payment and that Manufacturers's conduct was what blocked Union Bank from blowing the whistle on
IBEC. Four days before Manufacturers honored IBEC's fraudulent
documents, Union Bank had asked Manufacturers to provide some
details with respect to IBEC's first rejected presentation. 56 Manufacturers's reply, however, was unresponsive: It merely told Union Bank
that IBEC was going to try again on April 24 and did not identify the
discrepancies that had precluded payment.5 7 Union Bank did not
even get this telex until April 24, which was the very day IBEC got
paid.5 8 Also in the interim, Manufacturers never bothered to tell
Union Bank that IBEC had knocked on the door two more times and
both times it had rejected IBEC's presentations.5 9 Thus, the arguable
reason why Union Bank did not try to act sooner was because Manufacturers's conduct had prevented Union Bank from learning that
there was a need to act sooner.
In the district court, Union Bank had asserted that when "four
days before Manufacturers disbursed the funds, Union asked Manufacturers why it had previously rejected the documents[,]" Manufacturers "did not specifically advise of the discrepancies but only replied
'documents presented with some discrepancies.' "m Using these
had
facts, Union Bank argued "that it may have discovered the fraud
2 61
Manufacturers advised Union of the discrepancies early on.
The district court concluded, however, that such an argument
"misses the mark" and stated that "neither custom, Code, nor [UCP]
requires [the] issuer to notify its customers before rejecting non-conforming documents, although issuers often do consult customers, as a
matter of etiquette, for purposes of securing customer's waver [sic] of
defects." 262 The problem is that what the district court diminished
into a mere "matter of etiquette" is, in truth, an implicit component of
the UCP.
As we said, in a rectangular transaction, the beneficiary often enjoys an alliance with its confirming bank. Thus, in the rectangle, what
256. Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1418.

257. Id.
258. Id. at 1418-19.
259. Id
260. Id at 1422.
261. Id.
262. Id.(citing Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 237 (5th Cir.
1983)).
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was Article 16, and is now Articles 13 and 14, compels an issuer to
promptly examine documents and notify the confirming bank of fatal
defects.263 In so doing, the UCP contemplates that the issuer will
serve as an overseer or watchdog. As such, the UCP encourages the
issuer to be vigilant with respect to a payment.that is to take place in a
distant land between a local bank and local beneficiary. Consequently, in the rectangular context, the UCP by prompting an issuing
bank, like Union Bank, to actively assert some control over payment,
bestows upon the issuer-a means of preventing fraud.
In Banque, the issuer actually attempted to function as the overseer or watchdog. In fact, by assuming that role, Union Bank early on
sought information from the confirming bank. Had Manufacturers
simply given the issuer information, Union Bank might have been
able to discover the fraud and perhaps prevent it. And had Manufacturers merely answered Union Bank's question, Union Bank at the
very least might have sensed that something was not quite right and
might have watched the transaction more closely and might have been
ready to act with greater celerity.
While the Banque court's finding that Manufacturers had no obligation to answer Union Bank's question thwarts basic policies behind
the UCP, it also derogates a significant aspect of the UCC. As we
said, one of the most basic letter of credit tenets is the independence
principle, which means that banks should concern themselves only
with documents and not with the underlying transaction.264 Under the
UCC, fraud, however, activates a critical exception to the principle of
independence.-65 Where there is forgery or fraud, courts may, on the
basis of the underlying transaction, enjoin a bank's payment under a
letter of credit. 2 Thus, the UCC gives a party a means of preventing
fraud by rushing into court to enjoin a bank's honor of a presentment
or a beneficiary's draw, or both.
In Banque, after Union Bank learned of IBEC's first attempted
presentment from its own customer, it reasonably tried to obtain more
information from the confirming bank. Had Manufacturers simply
provided that information, Union Bank, its customer, Eleck, or both
might have investigated and learned of the fraud and then under the
aegis of the UCC sought injunctive relief to prevent the fraud. Thus,
the potential dialogue between the two banks is something to be en263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra notes 75-81, 96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-31, 58-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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couraged. The Banque court should have instead put its imprimatur
on that salutary dialogue between the banks because such transmittals
of information can prevent fraud on banks in letter of credit
transactions.
Third, the Second Circuit in Cochin II found that had Cochin
"imparted [the information] in a timely fashion, some part or all of the
funds might have been recovered." 267 As such, the Second Circuit acknowledged that causation or curability is germane. In Banque, however, the district °court had rejected what it denominated Union
Bank's "usefulness of notice"268 argument and, in so doing, relied not
just on its interpretation of the Second Circuit decision in Cochin II,
269
but also on an Eleventh Circuit decision, Pro-Fab,Inc. v. Vipa, Inc.
Pro-Fab, however, is similar to the Voest-Alpine case on which the
district court in Cochin I improperly relied.270 Pro-Fab also does not
espouse the proposition that courts should ignore the futility of more
timely or specific notice when the notice is to go from an issuing bank
to a confirming bank.
In Pro-Fab,which did not arise out of a rectangular transaction,
the issuing bank refused to honor the draft and sent the beneficiary a
list of defects.27 1 Although the beneficiary had cured all but a few of
these defects by the expiration date, the bank still continued to refuse
payment.27 2 In, an action against the bank foi wrongful refusal to
honor the letter of credit, the beneficiary argued that the bank had
violated certain provisions of the Georgia statute by failing to give
notice of dishonor within the mandatory time frame.2 73 The bank,
conceding that it failed to give timely notice, argued, inter alia, that
"notice was irrelevant because [the beneficiary] admits that it could
never have produced the two missing documents no matter how much
time it was given."2 74 In rejecting the bank's argument, the Eleventh
Circuit stated:
The bank's duty to notify is in no way contingent upon its
evaluation of the usefulness of the notice. The fact that [the
b]ank has now realized in hindsight that [the beneficiary] did
not have direct access to the required documents because
267.
268.
269.
'270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213.
Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1423.
772 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1985).
See supra text accompanying note 186-195.
Pro-Fab,772 F.2d at 850.
Id.
Id at 854.
Id.
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they were passing through another department of the bank
would not excuse a failure to give timely notice in March
1983.275
While there were many distinctions between Banque and ProFab, one of the most striking was that in Pro-Fab,the notice was to be
given by the issuing bank directly to the beneficiary. 276 In Banque,
the notice was to be given by the issuing bank to the confirming
bank.2 77 As discussed above, a critical purpose of notice in the rectangular transaction is to give the issuer a means of preventing the confirming bank from paying out on fraudulent documents. Under the
circumstances in Banque, where payment had already-been made,
where the fraud was already consummated and the damage already
done, the issuing bank's delay could have no impact whatsoever on
such an objective behind the notice provision.
Also, because in the triangular Pro-Fab,the purpose of the notice
was to give the beneficiary an opportunity to review and perhaps cure
the defects, the Pro-Fab court concluded that such a purpose-that of
curing defects-was not served where a bank makes a unilateral evaluation that the beneficiary cannot effectuate a cure.2 78 In Banque,
unlike the situation in Pro-Fab,Union Bank did not fortuitously realize in hindsight that defects could not be cured.2 79 Instead, when
Union Bank received the nonconforming documents, it was then true
that no matter how quickly it had acted; it could not have prevented
the loss by stopping the local bank from accepting the fraudulent
documents. 80
In short, both the district court in Cochin I and the district court
in Banque relied on inapposite cases arising out of triangular transactions. In fact, both district courts adhered to precedent that did not
involve an issuing bank and a confirming bank and the perpetration of
fraud. According to the Second Circuit's reasoning in Cochin II, however, causation or curability should apply to a case like Banque.3 1
Specifically, in a rectangular transaction, the UCP's notice provisions
have a twofold purpose; affording the beneficiary an opportunity to
cure defects and encouraging issuing banks to take measures to prevent a confirming bank from accepting a fraudulent demand for pay275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id. at 850.
Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1419.
Pro-Fab,772 F.2d at 854.
Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1422-23.
Id.
See Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213.

-

.
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ment. Had the Banque court really followed the appellate decision in
Cochin II and considered the goals behind the UCP, it would have at
least allowed Union Bank to try to show to a fact finder that more
expeditious or more detailed notice would have done nothing to advance either purpose behind the notice provisions.
Fourth, as we said, the Second Circuit emphasized that Cochin
was the bank "in the best position to learn of the fraudulent nature of
St. Lucia's activities and to prevent payment of the funds" and that
Cochin's "failure to take advantage of that position, in spite of several
opportunities to do so, resulted in the loss it [sought] to charge to
[Manufacturers]."
In accordance with what is the Second Circuit's
implicit adoption of a comparative culpability analysis, the court in
Banque should have considered or at least permitted Union Bank to
show that it was Manufacturers that was in the best position to prevent the fraud and Manufacturers that failed to do so. Union Bank
might also have shown that Manufacturers had effectually contributed
to the fraud. After all, in Banque, it was Manufacturers that knew of
IBEC's three rejected presentations, and it was Manufacturers that
should have been aware of a potential fraud. Also, when Union Bank
took it upon itself to try to learn more about IBEC's first rejected
presentation, Manufacturers's lack of cooperation had the effect of
keeping Union Bank in the dark and, thus, of impairing Union Bank's
ability to try to halt the payment of the funds.
In sum, the Second Circuit in Cochin II envisioned a rectangular
letter of credit case, which involved an issuing bank that although failing to comply with its UCP notice obligation, it nevertheless either
prevailed or survived summary judgment. Banque was that very case
and should have been the one in which the issuer had either a summary victory or a trial.
V.

CONCLUSION

Rectangular UCP disputes, such as Cochin and Banque, which
involve an issuing bank and confirming bank, are significant because
they present a context in which several rules of certainty and efficiency converge. The rule of strict compliance, which precludes a
bank from looking beyond the face of the documents to the underlying transaction, serves to advance the goal of certainty and efficiency.
The UCP's rule of preclusion, which sanctions a bank for its failure to
perform its timeliness or rejection notification duties, also serves the
282. Id at 213.
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lord of certainty and efficiency.a Moreover, because courts view
such cases as "particularly appropriate for judicial resolution without
trial[,]" 2 4 the cases also implicate that certain and efficient summary
judgment mechanism.
Implicit in the Second Circuit's analysis in Cochin II is the notion
that rules of certainty and efficiency should not be so invariably rigid
that they undermine the fundamental jurisprudential objective of fairness. Specifically, the appellate court in Cochin II allowed a bank to
escape the consequences of its violation of the strict compliance rule
not just because its opponent had triggered the UCP's preclusion
sanction, but also because of the particular circumstances before it.
Thus, what emanates from the Second Circuit decision is, in truth, a
vision of a hypothetical antithesis. That is, the Second Circuit described an issuing bank escaping the UCP's preclusion sanction, not
just because its opponent had violated the strict compliance rule, but
because of the presence of one or more facts. Inherent in the Second
Circuit decision is an acknowledgment that the envisioned hypothetical might be one in which the law is not "sufficiently chartered" to be
resolved on summary judgment. 2 5 On its broadest level the Second
Circuit in Cochin II may constitute an essay on the jurisprudential
pursuit as something other than a mere yearning for certainty and
efficiency.
Banque is significant not just because it illustrates the complete
derogation of the approach implicitly endorsed in Cochin, but also
because it discloses the ramifications of thwarting the policies of
Cochin. While the Cochin court implicitly acknowledged that a lapse
of more than three days can, in some instances, satisfy the UCP's time
requirements, the Banque courts mechanically branded the lapse of
five to eight business days as unreasonable as a matter of law. While
the appellate court in Cochin II said that a "rationale" could justify an
issuing bank's delay, 6 the Banque courts summarily rejected a compelling justification.
While the Cochin II court acknowledged that
causation of loss or curability should be considered in determining liability, the Banque courts perfunctorily exonerated the very bank that
283. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
284. Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1537
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Dulien Steel Prods. Inc. v. Bankers Tist Co., 298 F.2d 836,837 (2d Cir. 1962); Transamerica Delaval Inc. v. Citibank, N.A.,
545 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
285. Cochin I, 612 F. Supp. at 1537.

286. See Cochin 1I, 808 F.2d at 213.
287. Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1421.
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caused the loss or could have-but did not-prevent the loss.28 And
while the Cochin II court posited a comparative culpability analysis,
the Banque courts avoided just such a comparison and ended up expeditiously convicting the least culpable party.289
Further, the Banque courts defeated the principle which was inherent in Cochin, that rules of certainty and efficiency should not be
so unyielding that they effectively preclude fairness290 and effectively
engender loss. That is, in Banque, the blind devotion to "promoting
certainty in letter of credit transactions '291 resulted in not only punishment for the almost blameless party, but also dangerous precedent,
which would not serve to hinder-but instead facilitate-letter of
credit fraud upon banks.
In sum, the inquiry in such a rectangular dispute should be, in
essence, the one that emerges from the appellate decision in Cochin
HI. The district court in Banque recognized that the task before it was
"undoubtedly . . difficult since a fraud ha[d] been perpetrated on
both banks." 2 It is here quite significant that the common denominator, the independence principle, resides in the rule of strict compliance 293
as well as the timeliness anid notification requirements of the
UCP.
Fraud is, as was also stated, one critical exception to the rule
of strict compliance, which allows scrutiny beyond the face of the documents to theunderlying transaction.294 Thus, it follows that a rectangular dispute, which involves a fraud, epitomizes the kind of dispute
that courts should not resolve by mechanistically applying one rule
over another. Instead, as the UCC contemplates, fraud or forgery
288. Compare Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213 (rejecting Cochin I's rationale for justifying its
delay thereby implying adequate rationale may have been acceptable) with Banque, 787 F.
Supp. at 1423 (rigidly enforcing three-day rule set forth in UCC §5-112).
289. Compare Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213 (holding Cochin liable because it was in best
position to prevent loss and because it failed to take advantage of opportunities to avoid
loss) with Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1422 (stating "Manufacturers owed no duty to inform,
Union").
290. Cf Stempel, supra note 7,,at 164-65. Professor Stempel stated:
If the judge is making evaluations of fact, the judge is therefore engaging in conduct that was traditionally regarded as a jury function. When this occurs in "cases
at law," however that phrase is defined, it would seem that these new summary
judgment, directed verdict, and judgment n.o.v. ground rules violate the seventh
amendment.
Id.

291.
292.
293.
294.

Banque, 787 F. Supp. at 1424.
Id. at 1420.
See supra notes 58-60, 83-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33, 69-73 and accompanying text.
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justify an inquiry into the particular underlying
should instead
2 95
circumstances
First, as the Cochin II court has determined, there is no set time
frame for the reasonable time or without delay requirements of the
UCP's Article 16.296 Because, as explained above, "[t]he reasonableness of a period of time-except as to extremes-[is] a classic issue
for the trier of fact[,]" ' 2 97 where, as in the Banque case, the lapse of
time from receipt of the documents to notification is relatively short
and even possibly less than seven banking days, the issue, at least,
presents a question of fact.
Second, in such disputes, courts should, as the appellate decision
in Cochin HI suggests, consider whether there is a "rationale to justify
[the issuer's] delay."2 98 That is, even if the issuer's dishonor notification is untimely or otherwise improper, the issuer could conceivably
prevail against the confirming bank if there is an adequate justification for the delay or omission. The conduct of the confirming bank, of
course, can and should figure into the analysis.
Third, although some commentators view the strength of the
UCP's preclusion provision as its eradication of the elements of classic
waiver and estoppel-that of detrimental reliance or causation and
curability 299-these very elements should come right back into the
analysis in a rectangular dispute involving fraud where there are two
banks that have both broken UCP rules. As the appellate court in
Cochin II indicated, courts should, of course, consider which bank acted in such a way as to cause the loss and which bank could have taken
measures to prevent the loss.
Fourth, and perhaps as an inextricable aspect of causation or curability, courts should, as the Cochin II court suggested, consider which
bank was more at fault. A focus on comparative culpability has to
bring' about a more fair result through the imposition of liability on
the more culpable party. A comparative culpability approach will also
promote greater vigilance on the part of both~banks and in so doing,
serve to discourage or prevent letter of credit fraud.
This four-factor approach, however, does not necessarily lend itself to resolution on summary judgment. In particular, an inquiry,
295. See supra note 70.
296. Cochin II, 808 F.2d at 213; see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
297. Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 702
(1st Cir. 1978); see also supra note 181 (listing cases for similar proposition).
298. Cochin II, 808 F,2d at 213.
299. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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that subsumes issues like reasonableness, that invites parties to proffer
justifications, that entails the weighing of causation or curability, and
that involves an analysis of comparative fault will typically implicate
questions of fact. Concededly, the four-factor approach can be villainized as an affront to the post-Celotex "bench trial on paper" 3" and
portrayed as an archaic revitalization of the once esteemed Seventh
Amendment. 30 1 Such an approach, however, will probably tend to engender greater fairness and vigilance on the part of banks. Specifically, the approach, although ostensibly at odds with the
jurisprudential obsession with certainty and efficiency, is closer to
what Keats called negative capability with its toleration of "uncertainties, mysteries [and] doubts. ' '3 1 But in its most expansive sense, the
implication is that artistic and jurisprudential attainment need not always be antipodal.

300. See Childress supra note 10, at 184.
301. See supra text accompanying note 7.
302. See KEATS, supra note 1, at 277.

